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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the intergovernmental conference and the organisation of 
the Europe of security and defence 
(i) Sincerely wishing the 1996 intergovernmental conference to make qualitative progress allowing 
Europe to be given the means necessary for creating a true European security and defence identity in 
conformity with the aims set out in the Maastricht Treaty, i.e. to affirm Europe's identity on the inter-
national scene; 
(ii) Noting the decisions taken at the ministerial meeting of the Council in Madrid, on 14th November 
1995, and the publication of the three documents approved by the Council at that meeting; 
(iii) Noting nevertheless that, while for the majority ofWEU member countries the only possible way to 
ensure the coherence of European foreign, security and defence policies lies in the progressive integration 
of WEU into the European Union, the Council has failed to reach agreement on this question for lack of 
the necessary unanimity; 
(iv) Wishing therefore to help to promote a consensus in the Council with a view to enabling WEU to 
present a joint position at the intergovernmental conference with the backing of the Assembly; 
(v) Noting that the options now being discussed in the European Union and in WEU are exclusively at 
institutional level and do not take into account other approaches for a more specific sharing of responsibi-
lities and tasks between the European institutions; 
(vi) Stressing that the extent of institutional reforms envisaged for progressively creating a single Euro-
pean framework likely to ensure the coherence of common foreign, security and defence policies must 
necessarily be limited insofar as the member countries of WEU (variable geometry organisation) and of 
the European Union are at present not exactly the same; 
(vii) Recalling also that it is inconceivable to decide on institutional options for a merger between WEU 
and the European Union and between their treaties without a joint concept of the Europe of defence and 
of its ultimate aims that takes account of the conditions defined hereafter, and, as an initial approach to the 
question, giving consideration to the Council document on European security: a common concept of the 
27 WEU countries; 
(viii) Stressing that this common concept must take account of the nuclear issue in the light of recent 
events such as the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the will expressed by 
European governments to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty and France's offer to make its nuclear deter-
rent capability available for Europe's defence; 
(ix) Endorsing the joint position reached in the European Union and WEU according to which the 
principle of national sovereignty must remain the essential reference in defence matters, which must be 
governed by consensus; 
(x) Convinced that, if the European Union is not managing to affirm its true identity on the international 
scene in accordance with Article B of the Maastricht Treaty, it is not due to the absence of a link subordinating 
WEU to the European Union but to the latter's inability to implement a common foreign and security policy; 
(xi) Consequently convinced that the best way to promote the European defence identity is to reach 
agreement on intermediate options for completing the strengthening of the role of WEU so that the latter 
might act on behalf of the European Union; 
(xii) Recalling particularly in this context Recommendations 558, 565 and 575; 
(xiii) Recalling also that the Assembly will present its contribution to the intergovernmental conference of 
the European Union at an extraordinary session of the Assembly to be held in London on 22nd and 23rd 
February 1996; 
( xiv) Recalling the importance for WEU of the discussions now being pursued in the European Union for 
rationalising and improving CFSP decision-making procedures with specific regard to: 
- the possible creation of an analysis and forecasting unit; 
- ways and means of arranging the duration and rotation of presidencies; 
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- the role of the European Commission; 
- questions linked to financing CFSP action; 
- the organisation of parliamentary supervision. 
(xv) Sincerely regretting therefore that the Council has not followed the Assembly's recommendations 
for it to be represented on the Reflection Group of the European Union; 
(xvi) Strongly reaffirming its position that any question relating to the modified Brussels Treaty must be 
handled exclusively by the signatories of that treaty and of its protocols; 
(xvii) Further stressing, on the one hand, the need to strengthen the operation ofWEU as European pillar 
of NATO and, on the other hand, the importance of the role that associate member countries of WEU are 
called upon to play in this evolution; 
( xviii) Also stressing the close links WEU has established with the associate partner countries and the 
importance of the latters' contribution to the formulation of a common security and defence policy, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Support the proposals the Assembly has made in this report, that are intended for the intergovern-
mental conference, and any to be submitted at the extraordinary session of the Assembly to be held in 
London on 22nd and 23rd February 1996; 
2. Seek a consensus for strengthening the European security and defence identity taking as a basis cer-
tain options to be defined for establishing closer links between WEU and the European Union and leaving 
the door open to progressive integration of WEU into the European Union, for which stages might be 
fixed; 
3. Agree that, during this process of evolution, WEU will be maintained as an irreplaceable European 
defence institution; 
4. Pursue its consideration of the new European security conditions, taking as a starting point its docu-
ment on European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries, in order to arrive at a basic pro-
posal for presentation by WEU to the European Union, and complete, as soon as possible, its work on the 
definition of a European defence policy taking the nuclear issue into account; 
5. Maintain, in agreement with the European Union, WED's ability to take political initiatives and act 
in the framework of a European security policy defmed by the European Union; 
6. Seek with the European Union ways and means of allowing WEU initiatives with defence impli-
cations to be confirmed by heads of state and of government without member countries of the European 
Union which are not members of WEU being able to block a consensus obtained in WEU; 
7. Participate more actively, by submitting its own contributions, in the discussions being conducted in 
the European Union for improving the CFSP decision-making process that might have specific conse-
quences for WEU; 
8. Continue to play its full role as European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance with a view to giving new 
impetus to Euro-Atlantic co-operation in security and defence matters; 
9. Intensify its relations with associate partner countries in order to pave the way for their subsequent 
accession to WEU; 
10. Increase its efforts to make WEU and all its agencies fully operational, in particular to take advan-
tage of the link with national parliaments provided by the Assembly and to safeguard its role. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Written contributions and discussions now 
abound on the subject of institutional reforms of 
the European Union included in the agenda of the 
1996 intergovernmental conference, while prepa-
ratory work for the conference is intensifying in 
the various bodies and working groups of the 
European Union and WEU. The Assembly of 
WEU is therefore faced with the problem of find-
ing the appropriate method, first of obtaining the 
widest possible consensus in terms of its attitude 
and its proposals for the organisation of a Europe 
of security and defence, and second of making 
itself heard at the appropriate time so that its 
thinking carries the greatest possible weight. 
2. The task is far from easy, because it 
involves reaching agreement on basic political 
directions for institutional adjustments, and 
because the Assembly has only limited means for 
ensuring that it is genuinely listened to outside the 
framework of WEU itself. Uncertainty over the 
timetable for the intergovernmental conference is 
another problem, although it seems that a measure 
of agreement has been reached recently for the 
conference to be started in the spring of 1996 
(under Italian presidency) and to be concluded 
towards the end of the same year (under Irish pre-
sidency) or possibly in early 1997 (under Dutch 
presidency in this case). 
3. In these circumstances, the decision to hold 
an extraordinary session of the Assembly of WEU 
in London on 22nd and 23rd February 1996, 
devoted exclusively to defining its position on the 
future shape of the Europe of security and defen-
ce, will give the Assembly a further, necessary 
opportunity to make its views better known, befo-
re governments take final decisions. However it 
must not be forgotten that initial positions will be 
formulated before the end of 1995, when the 
Reflection Group set up by the European Union is 
to submit a report on its work to the European 
Council, which the latter will consider at its 
summit meeting in Madrid on 15th and 16th 
December. 
4. Earlier, at the ministerial meeting of the 
WEU Council in Madrid on 14th November 1995, 
the ministers for foreign affairs and the ministers 
of defence of the WEU member, associate mem-
ber and observer countries approved a document 
they regarded as the WEU contribution to the 
European Union intergovernmental conference in 
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1996. However in deciding to transmit it to the 
Council of the European Union they disregarded 
the official request addressed to the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council by the President of the 
Assembly and similar requests from several chair-
men of delegations to their respective govern-
ments asking them not to take a decision until 
such time as the Assembly had made known its 
views on that contribution. The decision was all 
the more regrettable in that the Chairman-in-
Office had confirmed on 15th November 1995 
that the Council regarded the abovementioned 
document as WEU's final contribution to the 
intergovernmental conference. Moreover, under 
the Madrid declaration (paragraph II.4) the Coun-
cil holds this document to be the contribution of 
the WEU " Organisation " and in this connection, 
the Council needs to be reminded that the " organ-
isation" referred to is Western European Union 
and includes the Council, its subsidiary bodies 
and the Assembly 1• The document in question can-
not commit WEU as a whole unless the Assembly 
is involved in its preparation. As to the content, it 
has to be pointed out that the document does no 
more than discuss various options describing the 
possible future of relations between WEU, the 
European Union and the Atlantic Alliance and 
does not set out a common position on the Coun-
cil's preferred option. 
5. So the Assembly must pursue a twofold 
objective in its work. The first must be to urge the 
Council and the governments of WEU member 
countries to continue to seek a consensus, with the 
Assembly's help, enabling WEU to present a 
common position, supported by the Assembly, at 
the intergovernmental conference. The Council 
cannot believe that with the transmission to the 
European Union of the document released in 
Madrid, work on the preparation for the inter-
governmental conference has come to an end. The 
Council cannot allow the decision on WEU's 
future to be taken by other organisations. Secondly, 
the Assembly has to strive to reach a common 
position as a guide to national parliaments of 
member countries in the debates leading up to the 
ratification of possible changes to the treaties in 
question. 
6. It is therefore essential, in the light of the 
first results of the work done by the European 
Union and the decisions taken by the WEU Coun-
1. Article 1 of the Agreement on the Status of Western Euro-
pean Union, signed in Paris on 11th May 1955. 
cil on 14th November 1995 for the Assembly to 
present its view of things at its December 1995 
session. It is clear that, given of the short space of 
time separating publication of the Madrid declara-
tion and the Council documents on the " WEU 
contribution to the 1996 intergovernmental confer-
ence " and on " European security: a common 
concept of the 27 countries " from the meeting of 
the Political Committee on 16th November 1995, 
consideration of these documents can yield only 
provisional conclusions. That consideration will 
be taken to greater depth during preparation of the 
Political Committee's report to the Assembly at 
its extraordinary session in London. The present 
report takes account of the reply of the Council to 
the recommendations the Assembly has transmit-
ted to it since the conclusion and entry into force 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, your Rappor-
teur hoped to base his thinking on the content of 
the first part of the forty-first annual report of the 
Council. However this has proved impossible 
since, at the time of completing the drafting of 
the present report, the Council still had not trans-
mitted its annual report to the Assembly. 
7. This is a particularly serious situation at a 
time when it is essential for the Assembly to be 
informed promptly of the activities of the Council 
so that it may fulfil the functions assigned to it 
under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
In its Recommendation 565, the Assembly had 
already protested about the Council's delay in 
transmitting its annual report to the Assembly and 
urged it " to comply immediately with its obliga-
tions under Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty by submitting its annual report to the 
Assembly so that the latter can reply before the 
report loses its topicality, account being taken of 
the fact that this is not the first time that the report 
has arrived very late". In its reply to the afore-
mentioned recommendation, the Council stated 
that " The Permanent Council is aware of the 
necessity of timely submitting its annual report to 
the parliamentary Assembly and will do its utmost 
to achieve that goal in the future ". 
8. One might now question the value of such a 
commitment by " a Permanent Council ", a term 
not used in the modified Brussels Treaty. The 
"Council of Western European Union" is respon-
sible for the transmission of the annual report to 
the Assembly and the latter must again remind the 
Council in the strongest terms of the need for it to 
comply with this obligation. In any event, faced 
with the challenges confronting Europe in the 
coming years, if it wishes to advance towards 
agreement on the most appropriate way of organ-
ising a Europe of security and defence, the 
Assembly must redouble its efforts to defend its 
views, not merely among experts but also in 
public debate, where the Assembly's arguments 
and proposals have hitherto tended to be passed 
over in silence. 
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II. The present state of preparations for the 
1996 intergovernmental conference 
1. Work in the framework of the European Union 
9. According to Article J.4.6 of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the treaty provisions relating to the com-
mon foreign and security policy (CFSP) may be 
revised "on the basis of a report to be presented in 
1996 by the Council (of the European Union) to 
the European Council, which shall include an eva-
luation of the progress made and the experience 
gained until then ". For the preparation of this 
report, a Reflection Group was formed in June 
1994, at the European summit meeting in Corfu, 
chaired by Mr. Carlos Westendorp, Secretary of 
State for European Affairs at the Spanish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs; this group is composed of 
a representative from each member country of the 
European Union, one representative from 
the European Commission and two members of 
the European Parliament. 
10. The European Council agreed on this occa-
sion that the Reflection Group should have the 
following terms of reference: 
" The Reflection Group will examine and 
elaborate ideas relating to the provisions of 
the Treaty on European Union for which a 
review is foreseen and other possible 
improvements in a spirit of democracy and 
openness, on the basis of the evaluation 
of the functioning of the treaty as set out in 
the reports. It will also elaborate options in 
the perspective of the future enlargement of 
the Union on the institutional questions set 
out in the conclusions of the European 
Council in Brussels and in the Ionannina 
agreement (weighting of votes, the 
threshold for qualified majority decisions, 
number of members of the Commission 
and any other measure deemed necessary to 
facilitate the work of the institutions and 
guarantee their effective operation in the 
perspective of enlargement. 
The Reflection Group will be required to 
report in time for the meeting of the Euro-
pean Council at the end of 1995." 
11. On 1st September last, the Chairman of the 
Reflection Group, which began its work on 3rd 
June 1995, submitted an initial progress report 
consisting of 8 chapters, chapters 2 and 3 of which 
deal with institutional problems and chapters 6 
and 7 with the problems of the foreign and 
security policy of the Union, including defence 
questions. 
12. Before examining this report, some obser-
vations may be appropriate on the composition of 
the Reflection Group and the possible conse-
quences of its final report in areas of interest to 
WEU and its Assembly. As it appears from Chap-
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ter 7 of the progress report, the group is at present 
studying in detail the problems linked to the fut-
ure application of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the existence of WEU as an organisation and its 
relations with the European Union. It appears that 
five of the eighteen members of the group repre-
sent countries which are not members of WEU. 
To these must be added the representative of the 
European Commission and the two members of 
the European Parliament, none of whom are 
experts on defence. Most of the other members 
have been chosen for their experience in Euro-
pean affairs, which, in most national adminis-
trations, come under departments entirely 
separate from sections with security and defence 
responsibilities. 
13. While two members of the group are inde-
pendent experts in European and international 
law, only one country is represented by a former 
defence minister. The WEU Council has not fol-
lowed Recommendation 575, which proposed that 
it should arrange to be represented on the Reflec-
tion Group and ensure that all questions relating 
to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
are dealt with exclusively by the signatory coun-
tries of that treaty and its protocols. In its reply to 
the above recommendation the Council merely 
st~ted. that '.'the modalities of WEU's particip-
ation m the mtergovemmental conference will be 
considered by the Council in due course ... ". 
14. On examination of the document itself, one 
notes that the authors refer specifically in Chap-
ter 1 - " Challenges, principles and objectives " 
regarding the challenges which Europe faces in 
~xte~~l s~curity matters to: "major political 
mstability m the European region following the 
end ~f t;he cold war ·~ scarcely compensated by 
relative nnprovement m global security. The same 
chapter affirms that: 
" The responses to the challenges posed by 
the profound changes which have taken 
place outside the Union, in the political and 
security context as well as in the economic 
and commercial sphere, need to be based 
on reinforcement of the instruments set up 
to achieve the highest possible levels of 
external stability and security. " 
and that: 
" To cope with the new challenges that 
have arisen with regard to security in 
Europe, it is also necessary to face up to the 
question of whether the Union should pro-
vide itself with a real common defence 
policy." 
There is no difficulty in endorsing these assess-
~ents, which, moreover, merely take up again 
Ideas that are already widely recognised. It is in 
fact WEU that is examining the conditions of a 
connnon defence policy. 
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15. In Chapter 6: 
" The group points out that the new situa-
tion in Europe presents new challenges for 
the Union's external dimension and it 
acknowledges the shortcomings in the 
operation of Title V and problems of a lack 
of overall consistency in coping with the 
new challenges. Where the group is not 
agreed, on the other hand, is on a connnon 
assessment of the causes of such shortco-
mings and problems. A few consider that 
this is due merely to teething troubles with 
a novel part of the treaty, others that politi-
cal will is lacking and attitudes hidebound, 
while the majority also see a structural 
problem of a mismatch between ambitious, 
albeit somewhat vague, objectives and 
inadequate instruments for achieving 
them." 
16. More specifically regarding security and 
defence, the group notes in Chapter 7 of the pro-
gress report that: 
" The security and defence challenges in 
Europe and its innnediate vicinity and the 
global challenges to European territorial 
integrity cannot be met by member states of 
the Union in isolation, nor even by those 
with the strongest military forces. They 
therefore require a collective response. " 
17. It might be recalled in this connection that 
~e need for a collectiv~ response had been recog-
msed forty years earlier and that it led to the 
creation ofWEU and NATO. While the document 
~s very severe about the functioning of the CFSP, 
It should be noted that it contains no criticism of 
our organisation, its past or its present situation 
and makes no adverse connnent whatsoever on 
WEU. Nevertheless, it contains no in-depth think-
ing about the reasons why WEU's status and 
function should be reconsidered, apart from 
a reference to the " 1998 deadline ". Moreover, 
the document simply notes that " a majority of 
members see the way to the establishment of a 
genuine European security and defence identity as 
lying in the progressive integration of WEU into 
the EU ". 
18. The basic problem raised by this interim 
study and the probable results of the work of the 
group is due to a basic dilennna. While the group 
notes the divergent opinions of its members in 
analysing the causes of the poor functioning of 
Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, its terms of refer-
ence do not allow it to seek any answers other 
than institutional. Moreover, this interim text 
reflects clearly the lack of political direction 
defined at the highest level. Since governments 
have not reached agreement on this, the Reflec-
tion Group is in no position to take decisions or 
make specific proposals. 
19. As to the various suggestions in this 
connection considered by the Reflection Group, it 
should first be noted that the latter is unanimous 
in recognising that " The principle of national 
sovereignty remains the basic point of reference 
in defence matters and so consensus has to be the 
rule in this field ". From such an observation, 
consideration should logically follow of appro-
priate methods for promoting consensus in this 
area, as has been done in Recommendation 575 of 
the Assembly. The Reflection Group provides a 
procedural response to this question in suggesting 
that: 
" some flexibility should be brought to bear 
on that principle by applying the rule that 
no one can be obliged to take part in mili-
tary action by the Union. Nor can anyone 
prevent such action by a majority group of 
member states. In that event, any states not 
participating should show solidarity with 
the action taken, both financially and politi-
cally." 
20. Indeed, the application of the principle of 
consensus in this area has always called for flexi-
bility and a spirit of solidarity among all the part-
ners concerned. This is nothing new since it has 
already found expression in Article VII.3 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, whose flexible wording 
enabled a consensus to be reached in the frame-
work of WEU during the two Gulf wars: hence a 
number of WEU member countries carried out 
military actions in the region without others being 
obliged to participate or tempted to prevent those 
countries from intervening. 
21. The flexibility of the treaty also promoted 
agreement among member countries on the moda-
lities of " Petersberg " type missions: indeed they 
have indicated that decisions to participate " in 
specific operations will remain a sovereign deci-
sion of member states in accordance with national 
constitutions ". The possibility of choosing there-
fore already exists. Undoubtedly one might 
endeavour to formulate even more specific word-
ing in order to consolidate the legal bases of this 
principle, by including financial provisions for 
example. However, any attempt to refine the exis-
ting legal framework might jeopardise its flexi-
bility and increase opportunities for disagreement. 
22. On the subject of the relationship between 
the European Union and WEU, the document 
notes that continued autonomy for WEU as the 
only option in the foreseeable future is the view of 
a minority school of thought in the Reflection 
Group. According to this minority, WED's auto-
nomy " allows defence matters to be kept clearly 
within the intergovernmental sphere, avoids 
weakening the commitments entered into within 
WEU and NATO (Article V guarantee) and 
enables full allowance to be made for the diversity 
of national positions and for the mismatch bet-
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ween Union and WEU membership. Such cont-
inued autonomy for WEU in relation to the Union 
should be accompanied by greater complementar-
ity between the two politically (parallel EU-WEU 
summits), administratively (harmonisation of pre-
sidencies and secretariats) and operationally 
(through the strengthening of WED's capabi-
lities)". This position reflects in large measure 
the one that the United Kingdom Government 
presented to its partners in its memorandum of 
1st March 1995. 
23. The progress report continues: 
" A number of members, chiefly represen-
ting countries which are not members of 
WEU, do not think a merger feasible, at any 
rate not in the foreseeable future. The rea-
son for this is that their countries' special 
position does not allow them to take on all 
of the obligations under the Brussels 
Treaty, in particular the automatic territorial 
guarantee in Article V. On the other hand 
they do seem prepared to give favourable 
consideration to participation in the Peters-
berg tasks. Lastly, a majority of members 
see the way to the establishment of a genuine 
European security and defence identity as 
lying in the progressive integration of 
WEU into the EU with its two potential 
aspects: territorial defence under the 
Article V guarantee and the new aspect of 
defence (Petersberg tasks). Such a merger 
follows logically from the treaty and is the 
only means of achieving consistency bet-
ween political union, foreign policy and 
defence. In their view, the progressive 
development of a defence dimension to the 
Union with a mutual assistance guarantee 
would reflect all-round solidarity between 
Union members which cannot be confined 
to the economic sphere alone. With that 
prospect of eventual merger between the 
EU and WEU in view, some members see a 
need to establish a timetable with a target 
date for a full merger, while others think it 
sufficient to set a date for discussing a final 
merger in future and determining arrange-
ments for it. For those members in favour 
of a merger, it is important for the conference 
to establish legal and political links bet-
ween the two organisations as well as a 
minimum set of operational resources 
enabling WEU to act as the EU' s military 
arm in the field of crisis-management, 
crisis-prevention and peace-keeping." 
24. At a press conference given in Strasbourg 2 
on 11th July 1995, Mr. Westendorp stated that in 
his opinion the process of merging WEU and the 
2. Nouvelles Atlantiques, 14th July 1995. 
Euro ean Union might begin, for example, in the 
year 000, as that date would correspond approxi-
mate to a new phase of enlargement. He did, 
how ver, confirm that the United Kingdom 
was pposed to WEU being integrated into the 
Unio. 
25. In the framework of the discussions being 
cond cted in the Reflection Group with a view to 
findi g intermediary ways and means between 
auto omy and integration of WEU in the 
Euro ean Union, reference has been made to the 
creat on of a link subordinating WEU to the 
Euro ean Union " either by amending Article 
J.4.2 of the treaty or by means of a binding 
agree ent whereby WEU would implement EU 
decis ons with defence implications. It has also 
been suggested that Petersberg task matters be 
inclu ed in the treaty, while leaving the question 
of te · torial defence for an annexed protocol. In 
this ay it would be possible to make allowance, 
in th immediate future, for the special situation 
of ce · states, which would thus have a tempo-
rary erogation or an "opt-in" which some 
woul like to see apply for a pre-established 
perio . " 
26. Confronted with these obvious divergen-
cies, the considerations which determined the 
searc for compromise wording in the drafting of 
the t xts deserve detailed examination. It should 
be e phasised in particular that, if the above sug-
gesti n were acted upon it would mean the end of 
the odified Brussels Treaty; your Rapporteur 
inten s to return to the problem in Chapter Ill of 
his r ort. 
27. To complete the list of subjects studied by 
the eflection Group, it should be noted that the 
latte tackled the question of co-operation in 
arm ents production and export and one of its 
mem ers proposed amending Article 223 of the 
Trea establishing the European Community 3 but 
with ut specifying in what way. 
3. · le 223 reads: 
" I. e provisions of this treaty shall not preclude the appli-
cation of the following rules: 
(a) no member state shall be obliged to supply informa-
tion, t e disclosure of which it considers contrary to the 
essen al interests of its security; 
(b) any member state may take such measures as it consi-
ders n essary for the protection of the essential interests of 
its sec ·ty which are connected with the production or trade 
in , munitions and war material, such measures shall not 
adver ly affect the conditions of competition in the common 
marke regarding products which are not intended for speci-
fically military purposes. 
2. D · ng the first years after the entry into force of the 
Trea the Council shall, acting unanimously, draw up a list 
of pr ucts to which the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) shall 
apply. 
3. Th Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the C mmission, make changes in this list. " 
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28. In the framework of discussions on the 
improvement of the instruments of the CFSP 
(common foreign and security policy), a number 
of proposals have been put forward, implementa-
tion of which would also have implications for 
WEU, even if the latter were to remain an autono-
mous organisation with stronger links with the 
European Union. According to the progress report 
of the Reflection Group, several members " think 
the Union should be given international legal per-
sonality"; in this context the report lists the follo-
wing suggestions: 
" The Group is agreed that an analysis, 
forecasting, planning and proposal unit or 
body should be set up for the common 
foreign policy. In principle reform of the 
treaties would not necessarily be required 
in order to set one up." 
As regards its composition and location, 
there are basically two options under dis-
cussion, both of which involve embodi-
ment of the CFSP in the figurehead of a 
" Mr. or Ms. CFSP ". 
- Some advocate locating the unit at the 
General Secretariat of the Council, with 
its facilities strengthened and the Secre-
tary-General raised in rank to ministerial 
level. Those in favour of this option 
point to the merit of abiding by the pre-
sent institutional framework by not 
creating any new bodies and highlight 
the desirability of placing the unit at the 
Council on account of the central role 
played by states within the CFSP. 
- The other option is to create a new post 
of High Permanent Representative for 
CFSP, appointed by the European 
Council, ranking at least on a par with a 
Minister, to conduct the Union's external 
political affairs and represent it. That 
person would chair the Political Com-
mittee and would be in charge of the new 
planning and analysis unit. In practice 
the unit would be a "tripartite" body 
made up of the member states, the Coun-
cil and the Commission. (The presence 
of WEU representatives has even been 
suggested). 
29. Regarding the role of the Commission: 
" ... the majority of the group think that the 
Commission should be involved with 
planning and analysis work in the interests 
of the necessary consistency in all aspects 
of the Union's external action. A majority 
of the Group also oppose the creation of a 
new institution to handle the CFSP, prefer-
ring to look into options within the present 
institutional framework. " 
30. This question is closely linked with that of 
the future functioning of the presidency. In this 
connection, the group put forward the following 
ideas in Chapter 3 of its document: 
"The prospective enlargement (of the 
Union) would result in each country's turn 
coming round much less frequently, 
making it necessary to establish a system 
~hich will ensure greater permanence and 
visibility for the presidency without 
making more sporadic the participation by 
member states in an enlarged Union. To 
achieve that, the group has been looking at 
various arrangements that combine ele-
ments of permanence and rotation, such as 
presidency by teams, It is also considering 
the possibility of electing a President or 
High Representative of the Union for exter-
nal policy matters. 
On decision-making procedures, some see 
the fact that newly-qualified majority 
voting is not used as one of the causes of 
the CFSP's ineffectiveness. Others take the 
view that the consensus and a veto are 
essential in matters which lie so close to 
the heart of national sovereignty. As inter-
mediate options, the group explored ad hoc 
arrangements such as " consensus bar 
one", a "super-qualified majority" or 
" positive abstention " in order to over-
come the risk of deadlock in a field in 
which the Union needs to be able to take 
decisions. As regards implementation of 
the CFSP, two possible approaches are 
identified in the group, the first being to 
explore arrangements maintaining the 
central role of the presidency in external 
representation and implementation of the 
CFSP. This is the present approach under 
the treaty, although enlargement and the 
growing external responsibilities of the 
Union make it advisable, if that approach 
is to continue, to consider ways of giving 
the presidency a higher profile and greater 
permanency. Two possibilities are con-
ceivable here: a team presidency (see topic 3) 
and/or an elected presidency. The altern-
ative approach is to assign such imple-
mentation tasks to an ad hoc body (Mr. or 
Ms CFSP) whether the High Repre-
sentative for CFSP mentioned earlier or 
any other arrangement in which the 
member states and institutions have 
confidence. Some have pointed out that 
there is already a figure enjoying such 
confidence, namely the President of th,e 
Commission, who is appointed by the 
European Council and approved by the 
European Parliament. " 
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31. As regards the financing of the CFSP, an 
overwhelming majority of the Reflection Group 
believe it should be met from the community bud-
get. Such a development would have important 
consequences for WEU, in as much that the more 
the European Union authorities take the initiative 
on WEU actions, the stronger the institutional ties 
between the two organisations will become. The 
Maastricht Treaty currently draws a distinction 
between " administrative expenditure " financed 
from the European Community budget and 
" operating expenditure " whose inclusion in the 
community budget or in those of the member 
states is decreed by the Council of the Union. 
32. The questions raised by parliamentary 
supervision are tackled by the Reflection Group in 
the chapter on the CFSP and in Chapter 3 dealing 
with the institutional system in general. The group 
is naturally mainly interested in the role of the 
European Parliament and the majority of its mem-
bers feel that its role in CFSP matters cannot be 
the same as for those covered by community 
legislation: 
" Some members think it advisable to build 
on the present treaty provisions, centring 
on the European Parliament's right to be 
informed in this respect. Others think it 
necessary to go further and involve parlia-
ment more closely in determining the broad 
lines of the CFSP and in handling the 
Union's external political affairs by means 
of arrangements ensuring confidentiality. A 
few members are reluctant to see any 
increase in parliament's role and several 
point out that the EP should not under any 
circumstances be given powers not even 
enjoyed by national parliaments in an area 
in which governments conduct their foreign 
policy without prior authorisation by parl-
iament, except in cases distinguished by 
their extreme gravity " 
33. The progress report contains no thoughts 
on the implications of the parliamentary dimen-
sions of the CFSP, given that the Reflection 
Group unanimously accepts that the principle of 
national sovereignty remains the essential refer-
ence in defence matters and that this area must 
therefore be governed by consensus. It is only in 
considering their institutional aspects that the 
group deals with the respective roles of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the national parliaments. In 
this context the group merely registers agreement 
on not creating a second chamber. 
34. There is therefore no indication as to 
whether the group has examined the arguments 
developed on this subject in the report presented 
by Mrs. Aguiar. On the other hand, the group 
registers " agreement on the need to increase each 
national parliament's control over its government 
in Union affairs". In this connection the group 
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proposes to explore ways of associating national 
parliaments with European institutions and to 
examine more closely how to facilitate national 
parliamentary supervision of decisions of the 
Union. These suggestions are still very vague and 
in no way specify how the national parliaments 
would intervene at European level if the idea of a 
second chamber is ruled out. The example of the 
Conference of the Parliaments (Assises) provided 
for in the declaration (No. 14) of the Maastricht 
Treaty which was to be " consulted on the main 
features of the European Union", but which has 
never met, and that of the Conference of European 
Affairs Committees (CEAC) composed of mem-
bers of the European Parliament and the parlia-
mentary assemblies of the fifteen member states 
of the European Union show that a way has 
not yet been found to strengthen the role of the 
national parliaments in supervising decisions of 
the European Union. 
35. Although the group does not concern itself 
with the problem of parliamentary supervision of 
decisions taken in the framework of the CFSP and 
WEU that fall exclusively within the remit of natio-
nal sovereignty, it proposes to study the creation of 
a High Consultative Council on subsidiarity com-
posed of delegations of national parliaments. 
36. In the course of a meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Assembly of WEU held with 
Mr. Westendorp in Madrid on 19th October 1995, 
the latter conceded that neither he nor the large 
majority of the members of the Reflection Group 
were experts in security and defence but 
wondered if this factor were not something of an 
advantage. Furthermore, while confirming the 
broad outlines of the progress report, he informed 
members of the Standing Committee that the 
Spanish Government was among those who 
would prefer to take the intergovernmental 
conference as an opportunity to transfer responsi-
bilities for common defence to the European 
Union, eclipsing WEU as an independent organ-
isation, while preserving the responsibilities of 
the Atlantic Alliance. In this optic, the inter-
governmental conference would provide the 
opportunity to take advantage of the " 1998 dead-
line " on the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. The evolution of the positions of member governments 
37. It should be noted that parallel to the work 
of the Reflection Group, after the United King-
dom, the Netherlands and Italy had taken an 
initial stance on institutional reforms in security 
and defence matters in the first half of 1995 4, a 
4. See paragraph 1.3 of Recommandation 575 and the report 
by Mrs. Aguiar on " the future of European security and the 
preparation of Maastrich 11 - reply to the fortieth annual 
report of the Council" (Document 1458). 
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number of other governments have made known 
their attitude, more or less officially, while others 
have preferred to defer defining a firm position. 
38. On 30th June, Luxembourg published a 
memorandum on the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference in which it stated that in future WEU 
would be called upon to play an increased role. 
"No doubt, for the time being, WEU will 
remain a separate organisation. However 
inclusion in the future treaty of the objec-
tive ofWEU's integration by stages into the 
European Union would effectively bring 
the defence dimension into the integration 
process. Meanwhile, measures directed 
towards strengthening relations between 
the European Union and WEU are essen-
tial, such as associating WEU more closely 
with the work of the CFSP. " 
39. The memorandum by the Luxembourg 
Government does not tackle the question of pos-
sible subordination of WEU to the European 
Union, but considers that WEU should be in a posi-
tion to carry out " Petersberg " type missions on 
behalf of the EU. It also argues that all European 
Union countries should contribute to financing 
actions carried out by WEU on behalf of the Union. 
Regarding development of the CFSP, Luxembourg 
advocates the creation, within the Council Secre-
tariat-General of an analysis and forecasting unit 
with which the European Commission would be 
fully associated," assisted by WEU ". 
40. In Luxembourg's view, the field of appli-
cation of majority decision-making should be 
extended and the principle of " consensus bar one " 
would be a considerable step forward insofar as it 
would allow a member state to dissociate itself 
from a joint action without, however, being able to 
prevent it. Luxembourg states, furthermore, that it 
is in favour of closer association with the European 
Commission, particularly over joint actions, under 
the supervision of the Council. It feels that the 
CFSP should in principle be financed from the 
community budget. According to the memoran-
dum, actions with military implications would be 
decided without a member state being obliged to 
participate if it did not wish to do so, nor should it 
be able to prevent a majority from going ahead. 
WEU would be invited to carry out such actions. 
41. According to press reports 5, the Benelux 
countries are preparing to submit a joint memo-
randum on the question; meanwhile Mr. Jean-Luc 
Dehaene, Prime Minister of Belgium, addressing 
parliamentarians of the European Popular Party 
(PPE), in Bruges on 30th August 1995, stated: 
" The qualitative step the intergovern-
mental conference might take in this field, 
would, in my view, be to decide that the 
5. Le Monde, 22nd September 1995. 
European Union may instruct WEU to use 
certain military means, unlike the present 
situation where the European Union must 
request this of WEU without being certain 
that an autonomous WEU will accede to 
that request. " 
42. In a note dated 18th October 1995 addres-
sed to the Belgian Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate, the Belgian Government stated its posi-
tion as follows: 
" In a third approach, that preferred by the 
Belgian Government, WEU should draw as 
close to the European Union as possible 
with a view, ultimately, to integration. The 
complexity of integrating European 
defence and the awareness that, for a num-
ber of member states, defence forms part of 
the hard core of national sovereignty, 
strengthens the Government in its convic-
tion that progressive integration of WEU in 
the European Union is the best option. The 
intergovernmental conference should work 
towards this. The government recalls that 
the WEU treaty may be denounced in 1998 
so that the possibility of revising the treaty 
would then arise. The feasibility of major 
proposals will depend, inter alia, on the 
outcome of the intergovernmental confer-
ence. 
In the run-up to the IGC and during the 
conference itself, the government will try 
to achieve various qualitative advances, 
first concerning both the operational and 
the institutional role of WEU: 
- further development of WEU's operatio-
nal capabilities, particularly in the 
framework of the " Petersberg 
missions " (humanitarian actions, peace-
keeping, crisis-management). In this 
context, and aside from independent 
WEU initiatives, the government wishes 
to stress the importance of achieving the 
NATO concept of "separable, but not 
separate forces", in the form of combi-
ned joint task forces (CJTF). This would 
give WEU new momentum, without 
leading to any real duplication with 
~ATO; 
- administrative convergence between 
WEU and the European Union, through 
co-operation and the exchange of 
information between secretariats, har-
monisation of working methods and har-
monisation of the respective presi-
dencies; 
- convergence between WEU member 
states and observer countries (i.e. the 
member states of the European Union 
not members of WEU) by putting them 
11 
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on an equal footing in both practical and · 
organisational terms, but without WEU 
collective security and defence guaran-
tees applying to NATO non member 
states (no" back-door" guarantees); 
- action by WEU set under the cover of the 
CFSP, especially the provisions on joint 
action (which it was expressly declared 
in the Maastricht Treaty did not apply to 
questions with defence implications) and 
Community financing. The European 
Union must be empowered to assign 
tasks to WEU, in particular the conduct 
of Petersberg-type missions. The Euro-
pean Union's decision could be a major-
ity decision provided the majority 
includes all WEU members. Once the 
European Union decision was taken, it 
would bear the financial cost. However 
no member state could be obliged to 
send troops against its will; 
- additional qualitative advance in the 
integration of European defence to be 
achieved by proposing, after enlarge-
ment, a new EU Treaty including an 
explicitly-stated solidarity principle 
(without however giving automatic secu-
rity guarantees), an obligation to consult 
in the event of a threat and arbitration in 
the event of conflict between member 
states; 
- increased convergence between WEU 
and the European Union leading WEU 
associate members (Turkey, Iceland and 
Norway) gradually to replace their earl-
ier ties with WEU by new ones with the 
European Union (through the common 
foreign and security policy) ". 
43. On 1st July 1995, in presenting its views in 
preparation for the intergovernmental conference, 
the government of Greece recommended main-
taining in the framework of the CFSP too, the 
principle of unanimity, at least in areas affecting 
the vital interests of each member country. 
44. When they met in Porto Santo Stefano on 
14th and 15th July 1995, the Italian and German 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs made a joint 
declaration, containing the following passage of 
note: 
" 4. It is essential to develop the common 
foreign and security policy further in order 
to give it greater authority and effective-
ness. To this end, the Union's ability to 
decide and act must be improved essential-
ly though majority decision-making in the 
established areas and by extending analysis 
and planning capabilities. The European 
Parliament should be more closely associa-
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ted with the foreign and security policy of 
the European Union. 
The European Union should evolve so as to 
become a security Union and- eventually-
a defence Union, while fully preserving its 
transatlantic links. To this end, it is essen-
tial to strengthen WEU's role as an instru-
ment of the European Union for crisis-
intervention and to deepen the institutional 
links of the European Union and WEU, as 
well as making the latter subject to Euro-
pean Council directives. While WEU's 
integration in the European Union remains 
a long-term objective, the links between 
WEU and NATO must at the same time 
continue to be developed. " 
45. As to Spain, the Spanish Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Mr. Javier Solana, stated in an inter-
view with the Figaro, on 6th July 1995: 
" We believe that Western European Union 
must in future be the pillar of European 
security, while maintaining links with the 
Atlantic Alliance. At the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference, the door must be left 
open for WEU to be merged with the Euro-
pean Union. At present, Spain holds the 
presidency of these two institutions, which 
may lead to interesting results. At the 
meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, 
which will be held in Madrid at the end of 
the year, we shall already be working 
towards a merger. " 
46. Among the neutral countries which have 
chosen observer status in WEU, the Austrian 
Government set out guidelines on 30th May 1995; 
in this document it supports the proposal to create 
an" analysis capability" (which it calls a" plan-
ning cell "), answerable to the secretariat of the 
Union Council and composed of representatives 
of that secretariat, the European Commission and 
the member states. Austria should be open to the 
gradual introduction of the principle of majority 
voting with regard to the CFSP. However, in the 
area of military security the principle of unanim-
ity should be maintained. 
47. Although the proposal to create a "Mr. 
CFSP" was made at France's initiative, neither 
France nor Germany yet seems to have deter-
mined a final position. Despite rumours that the 
Franco-German machinery is grinding to a halt 
because differences between the two countries 
have driven them too far apart, other reports have 
it that the two governments say they are working 
together, and the result of their joint thinking is 
awaited 6• 
6. Le Monde, 22nd September 1995. 
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48. However, in a speech delivered to the Ger-
man Foreign Policy Society in Berlin on 12th 
October 1995, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, the German 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, insisted strongly that 
clear progress towards the incorporation of WEU 
into the European Union should be made in 1996. 
The inclusion of WEU in the " Richtlinienkom-
petenz " (general guidelines) of the European 
Council would be an important step in this direc-
tion. Nevertheless, individual member states can-
not be compelled to commit their armed forces. 
Conversely, no member state can prevent a majo-
rity of member countries acting together. 
49. Moreover, it appears that the government of 
Norway, an associate member ofWEU, is seeking 
to obtain the support of the United Kingdom 
Government to prevent WEU from being absorbed 
by the European Union, of which Norway is not a 
member. Like other European members of NATO 
that do not belong to the European Union, Norway 
fears that if WEU is absorbed by the Union it might 
be weakened as the European pillar of NATO. 7 
3. Work in the framework of WEU 
(a) The activities of the Council 
50. In their Lisbon declaration on 15th May 
1995, the WEU Ministers recalled" their decision 
in Noordwijk last November that WEU should 
make a timely contribution to the work of the 
1996 EU intergovernmental conference (IGC). 
Ministers held a first exchange of views on this 
contribution, which will re-examine and further 
develop the role of WEU and the provisions 
agreed at Maastricht, taking account of the pro-
gress made and experience acquired since the 
WEU Maastricht declaration of December 1991 
and the entry into force of the Treaty on European 
Union. The Ministers tasked the Permanent 
Council to present a report at their next meeting in 
November in Madrid. In this respect, they 
welcomed the intention of the incoming Spanish 
Presidency to present a reflection document on 
the WEU contribution to the intergovernmental 
conference to serve as the basis of the Permanent 
Council's report. They noted that the possibility 
of holding a meeting at summit level to finalise 
the WEU contribution to the intergovernmental 
conference continues to be considered. " 
I 
51. A seminar on WEU's contribution to the 
future European security and defence architec-
ture, the close of which was atte~ded by the Presi-
dent of the Assembly of WEU, 'was organised in 
Sintra (Portugal) on 3rd and 4th June 1995 at the 
level of political directors, senior officials respon-
sible for defence policy and permanent represen-
tatives of WEU member countries. 
7. The Times, 4th October 1995. 
52. On 13th July last, the Permanent Represen-
tative of the Spanish presidency, addressing the 
Presidential Committee of the Assembly, referred 
to the aims and priorities of the Spanish presi-
dency during its simultaneous term of office in 
WEU and the European Union: 
"- WEU must become a true defence 
component, in accordance with the 
terms of the Treaty on European Union 
and appended declarations; 
- the process of European integration 
will be completed only when it is 
equipped with an authentic security 
and defence dimension." 
... my government is preparing a document 
of reflection which will be the point of 
departure for the discussion in the Council 
on this question. 
This reflection must bear on three funda-
mental chapters, relations between WEU 
and the European Union, relations between 
WEU and the Atlantic Alliance and the 
operational development ofWEU. 
The main question to be examined with a 
view to the intergovernmental conference, 
and which is also the most complex, is that 
of the shape of institutional relations 
between the European Union and WEU. 
Article J.4 of the treaty of the Union will 
have to be revised in a specific manner. In 
this respect, we have retained three options 
which we believe can be achieved on the 
basis of certain joint premises: promote the 
European security and defence identity, 
overcome problems raised by the different 
geographical composition of the European 
Union and of WEU, maintain the inter-
governmental nature of defence, preserve 
the role of NATO in European defence and 
tighten Euro-Atlantic links. 
The first option would be to maintain, with 
certain improvements, the status quo of 
Maastricht. That would consolidate the 
present model by perfecting interaction 
between the European Union and WEU and 
the latter's operational capabilities. We do 
not believe this option is sufficient. 
The opposite to this option would be to 
include defence as an integral part of the 
European Union. This would imply the exis-
tence of a juridical framework to deal with 
defence questions in the European Union 
and the revision of the treaty provisions of 
the Union so as to create a collective defence 
system and security guarantee similar to that 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
13 
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Between these two options is a vast spec-
trum of possibilities characterised to a grea-
ter or lesser extent by the maintenance of 
the autonomous personality of each of the 
organisations but providing for a process of 
gradual convergence which would allow 
the merger of the two institutions in the 
future. 
Relations between NATO and WEU must 
take a prominent place in our thoughts, 
knowing from the outset that WEU must 
preserve its role of European pillar of the 
alliance and its complementarity in relation 
to that organisation. An analysis of the rela-
tions between these two organisations in 
the process of transformation must seek 
ways and means of achieving more balan-
ced relationships in which the European 
pillar of the alliance would no longer be a 
rhetorical phrase ". 
53. It should be noted that the document on 
"WEU's contribution to the European Union 
intergovernmental conference of 1996 ", drafted 
on the basis of the confidential working paper by 
the Spanish presidency was approved in Madrid 
on 14th November 1995 by the WEU Council " at 
18 ", in other words with the participation of the 
observer countries and the three associate mem-
ber countries which are not members of the Euro-
pean Union and therefore not participating in 
either the intergovernmental conference or the 
work of the Reflection Group set up by the Euro-
pean Union. The fact that Spain is providing the 
president both of WEU and the European Union 
doubtless facilitates exchanges of information on 
the progress and direction of work in the two 
organisations. 
54. However, it should be stressed that a contri-
bution from WEU such as this, which deals with 
the institutional questions to be discussed at the 
1996 intergovernmental conference makes sense 
only if the organisation at the same time com-
pletes its work on two documents: the common 
reflection on the new European security condi-
tions which should lead to the drafting of a white 
paper on European security; and the definition of 
a common defence policy on which the Council of 
WEU published preliminary conclusions in 
November 1994 and which, according to WEU 
ministers, should lead to a wide-ranging declara-
tion on European defence policy with a view to 
the 1996 intergovernmental conference. 
55. Hence during discussion of this report at 
the committee meeting held on 9th October last, 
several members rightly insisted on the need to 
assess the new risks that threaten European secu-
rity and the budgetary implications of this situa-
tion at a time when most WEU member countries 
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have considerably reduced their defence budgets 
following the disappearance of the major threat 
linked to East-West confrontation. Regarding risk 
assessment, it is to be welcomed that the docu-
ment on " European security: a common concept 
of the 27 WEU countries ", should lead to an 
extremely profound analysis of security problems 
that might arise at world level and include a det-
ailed description of European interests that might 
possibly require defending. 
56. Chapter II of this document attempts to set 
out a concept for strengthening WED's operatio-
nal capabilities in the fields of crisis-prevention 
and crisis-management but does not deal in depth 
with the budgetary implications. The preliminary 
conclusions on the formulation of a common 
European defence policy have, on the other hand, 
tackled this issue in connection with the operatio-
nal aspect of the problem and recommended that: 
" WEU must have available the necessary 
decision-making procedures and mecha-
nisms to ensure adequate and timely 
resourcing and fmancing of the preparation 
and implementation of these operations. 
The necessary arrangements including the 
issue of budgets and fixed contribution 
keys should now be examined at ministerial 
level as a matter of priority. . . " 
57. This crucial question will have to be exami-
ned in the wider context of drafting a white paper 
on European security. However, another subject, 
the importance of which should not be under-
estimated, is the need for discussion of the nuclear 
issue and whether or not a common defence 
policy should include nuclear aspects. This 
question is in fact discussed in the document 
" European Security: a common concept of the 27 
WEU countries", in the following terms: 
" France and the United Kingdom, member 
countries of WEU who are also members of 
the EU and NATO, are weapons states 
within the meaning of the NPT. 
In the language of paragraph 55 of the 
alliance's Strategic Concept, the funda-
mental purpose of nuclear forces is politi-
cal; it is "to preserve peace and prevent 
coercion and any kind of war ... by ensur-
ing uncertainty in the mind of any aggres-
sor about the nature of the allies' response 
to military aggression" and by demonstra-
ting " that an attack of any kind is not a 
rational option ". The Hague platform 
states that " To be credible and effective 
the strategy of deterrence and defence 
must be based on an appropriate mix of 
nuclear and conventional forces, only the 
nuclear element of which can confront a 
potential aggressor with an unacceptable 
risk". 
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The " Preliminary conclusions on the for-
mulation of a common European defence 
policy " (WEU Council of Ministers, 
Noordwijk, 1994), which borrow the lang-
uage of the Hague platform and the new 
Strategic Concept of the alliance, agreed 
respectively by WEU in 1987 and NATO in 
1991, state that "Europeans have a major 
responsibility with regard to defence in 
both the conventional and nuclear field ". 
The independent nuclear forces of the 
United Kingdom and France, which have a 
deterrent role of their own, contribute to the 
deterrence and overall security of the 
allies. " 
58. It should first be noted that Austria, Fin-
land, Ireland and Sweden, as they have pointed 
out, were not party to the discussions referred to 
on the rOle of nuclear forces in deterrence. 
Moreover it is clear from the aforementioned 
declarations that nuclear deterrence has to date 
been conceived either in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance or in a strictly national frame-
work, as in the case of France. Until now, the 
nuclear question has not played a part in the defi-
nition of a common defence at European level and 
therefore was not on the WEU Council's agenda. 
Hence in answer to Recommendation 517 reques-
ting it to " Instruct a working group to examine 
Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in 
the new circumstances with a view to defining a 
European concept of the role of nuclear weapons 
and developing consultations between its mem-
bers on the possibility of resorting to such wea-
pons ", it replied that these questions were " not at 
present on the agenda of the Council and its 
working groups ". 
59. In answer to the repeated request of the 
Assembly inviting it, in Recommendation 540, to 
"Re-examine the role of both United States and 
European nuclear weapons in European security 
in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in 
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ", the 
Council recalled in its reply that " nuclear 
questions are not at present on the agenda of the 
Council or its working groups". Finally, the pro-
posals in Recommendation 564 on the role and 
future of nuclear weapons aimed at establishing a 
strategic study group within WEU, inter alia: 
"- to examine the role and future of 
nuclear weapons for European security 
including the different aspects of intra-
European extended nuclear deterrence; 
- to examine the role all the WEU mem-
ber states might play in defining a 
future European nuclear strategy; 
- then to study the possibility of creating 
a nuclear co-ordination body within 
WEU; 
have not been acted upon by the Council which 
confined itself to recalling the mandate tasking 
the Permanent Council to begin work on the for-
mulation of a common European defence policy. 
60. Given the reactions in several European 
countries to France's decision to carry out a 
limited series of nuclear tests, followed by the 
proposal of the French Prime Minister on 6th Sep-
tember 1995 to offer Europe the benefits of deter-
rence through French nuclear weapons in the form 
of concerted deterrence, it seems essential to 
include in any white paper on European security 
and any broad declaration on European defence 
policy a section on the role of nuclear weapons in 
that policy. 
61. However, whether or not WEU countries 
can reach agreement on this essential problem is 
open to serious doubt. The Germans have rejected 
once and for all the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
and have invariably shown their preference for the 
American nuclear protection guaranteed them in 
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, 
the position of the United Kingdom must be taken 
into account, its Prime Minister, John Major, 
having stated on his last visit to France 8 that the 
United Kingdom deterrent force was already avail-
able for European security in the framework of 
NATO, with its tried and tested consultation and 
planning mechanisms based on the concept of bur-
den-sharing among all participating allies and that 
he saw no place for new institutions of deterrence 
in Europe outside NATO. 
62. If the main partners of Western European 
Union do not want a common defence which 
would also include nuclear aspects outside the 
structures of the Atlantic Alliance, it will be 
hardly possible to examine these questions in 
greater depth in WEU. The fact that France has 
never agreed to be subject the obligation laid 
down in Article Ill of Protocol No. Ill to the 
modified Brussels Treaty raises another problem. 
This states that: 
" When the development of atomic, biolo-
gical and chemical weapons in the territory 
on the mainland of Europe of the high 
contracting parties who have not given up 
the right to produce them has passed the 
experimental stage and effective produc-
tion of them has started there, the level of 
stocks that the high contracting parties 
concerned will be allowed to hold on the 
mainland of Europe shall be decided by a 
majority vote of the Council of Western 
European Union. " 
63. However, if one takes seriously Article J.4 
of the Maastricht Treaty according to which the 
common foreign and security policy includes all 
8. Le Monde, 29th-30th October 1995. 
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questions related to the security of the Union, dis-
cussion of nuclear deterrence in the appropriate 
framework - namely WEU, based on its treaty -
cannot be avoided. The Council will need to take 
account of this in the wide-ranging declaration on 
European defence policy that it has said it is draw-
ing up but which is not yet finished. 
(b) The work of the Assembly 
64. Since the conclusion of the Maastricht 
Treaty the Assembly has unfailingly drawn the 
Council's attention to the importance of not cal-
ling the modified Brussels Treaty into question 
and making it known that this treaty " remains 
one of the juridical bases of the union and that 
WEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamen-
tary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of the 
European Union, a part which will have its place 
in the European structure " (paragraph 1 of 
Recommendation 517). It also requested the 
Council to " proceed to no modification in the 
scope of the modified Brussels Treaty by any 
other process than international agreements 
subject to ratification " (paragraph 3 of Recom-
mendation 526). 
65. The Assembly has recommended that the 
Council support its juridically-based inter-
pretation of Article Xll of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, according to which the 1954 Paris Agree-
ments establish a new treaty, and conform to it 
(Recommendation 539), " retain the modified 
Brussels Treaty so that all the members of the 
European Union will be able to accede to its pro-
visions" (paragraph 3 of Recommendation 558) 
and " reconsider the WEU declaration 11 annexed 
to the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing 
the European members of NATO which are not 
members of the European Union the right to 
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty " (para-
graph 5 of Recommendation 558). 
66. The Assembly also recommended that the 
Council " open up real prospects of accession to 
the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner 
countries, irrespective of whether or not they 
belong to other European organisations " and " in 
so doing, ensure that any future enlargement of 
WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of 
the modified Brussels Treaty " (paragraphs 4 and 
5 of Recommendation 565). 
67. The reply of the Council to Recommen-
dation 517 merely refers to the replies to Written 
Questions 296, 297 and 298, which did not how-
ever deal with the problems addressed by that 
recommendation. However it is to be welcomed 
that the Council affirmed it had no intention of 
proceeding with modification in the scope of the 
modified Brussels Treaty by any process other 
than international agreements subject to ratifi-
cation (Reply to Recommendation 526). Conver-
sely, the Council did not follow the legal opinion 
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set out in Recommendation 539 of the Assembly 
nor the proposal in paragraph 5 of Recommenda-
tion 558. 
68. The Council replied to paragraphs 4 and 5 
of Recommendation 565 that " the development 
of WED's relations with associate partners close-
ly follows their relation~ wit~ the J?ur?pean 
Union ". This reply is especially mterestmg. m that 
it makes no reference whatsoever to the existence 
of a possible link between this question and 
NATO enlargement. Moreover, in the same reply 
the Council assures the Assembly " that any 
future enlargement of WEU will not be of a natu-
re to weaken the relevance and scope of Article V 
of the modified Brussels Treaty". This reply is 
also of major importance, particularly in relation 
to the current debate in the press on the arrange-
ments for an enlargement of WEU which would 
" freeze " the article in question. 
69. As far as preparation of the 1996 inter-
governmental conference (Maastricht 11) is 
concerned, in May 1994 the Assembly had 
recommended that the Council do so carefully 
and " fully associate the Assembly with the 
Council's reflection on its preparation for the ... 
conference ... to seek ... to clear up the ambi-
guities of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty 
with a view to obtaining a general mandate to 
elaborate and implement decisions and actions 
on behalf of the Union in WED's area of respon-
sibility " (paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 o~ Recommen-
dation 558). In RecommendatiOn 565, the 
Assembly asked that the Council: 
" 3. Play the role of a political driving force 
vis-a-vis the authorities of the European 
Union and the Atlantic Alliance with a 
view to developing guidelines for linking 
the Central and Eastern European countries 
with Euro-Atlantic structures; 
7. Include in its present studies the French 
Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a 
white paper on European security in 
connection with the Noordwijk preliminary 
conclusions on the formulation of a 
common European defence policy and 
ensure that the outcome of its examination 
of the development of a European defence 
policy provides the main source of inspir-
ation for the thinking process to be 
conducted in the framework of the CFSP 
and NATO; 
15. Study the conditions in which the ~U 
Council might meet as a European secunty 
and defence council, either as necessary or 
on the occasion of meetings of the Euro-
pean Council; 
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16. Organise a regular exchange of senior 
civil servants between "WEU" depart-
ments established in ministries for foreign 
affairs and defence and in the private 
offices of the heads of government of mem-
ber states; ". 
70. Finally, in Recommendation 575, the 
Assembly recommended that the Council: 
" 2. Prepare ... a concept for developing its 
relations with the European Union and 
NATO, paying particular attention to its 
future relations with the European member 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance which 
have now become associate members of 
WEU and transmit such assessment to the 
Assembly for early comment; 
4. Arrange to be represented on the group 
of experts established by the European 
Council and ensure that all questions rela-
ting to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty are dealt with exclusively 
by the signatory countries of that treaty and 
its protocols; 
5. Ensure that the 1996 intergovernmental 
conference results in WEU being recogni-
sed as an organisation authorised to act on 
behalf of the European Union in security 
and defence matters and that member coun-
tries of the European Union which are not 
members of WEU cannot block consensus 
achieved within WEU in this area; 
6. On the basis of the white paper on Euro-
pean security, develop a medium-term 
concept of the criteria, procedures and even 
the stages that should be adopted for 
placing the common defence policy on a 
new legal and institutional basis subse-
quently enabling defence questions to be 
set in the framework of the European 
Union; 
7. Agree that such an undertaking should be 
achieved within approximately ten years 
and use this period to examine how far. the 
modified Brussels Treaty should be revised 
and adapted to the new situation with a 
view to presenting proposals to another 
intergovernmental conference which might 
be convened at the end of the period 
mentioned above; 
8. Include in this medium-term concept 
provisions providing for more represen-
tative parliamentary supervision at Euro-
pean level, in particular by transforming 
the existing WEU Assembly into a second 
chamber, alongside the European Parlia-
ment thus confirming the role of delega-
tions from national parliaments, with res-
ponsibilities that are different from and 
complementary to those of the European 
Parliament; 
9. Ensure that no measure leading to the 
convergence of WEU and the European 
Union shall compromise the close co-oper-
ation between WEU and NATO; 
10. Manifest more clearly its will to meet its 
obligations under Article IX of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and leave no doubt, in its 
relations with other European and Atlantic 
authorities, about the fact that the WEU 
Assembly is the sole Assembly with respon-
sibility in security and defence matters in 
accordance with an international treaty; 
11. Take the necessary steps to give the 
Secretary-General of WEU the right of ini-
tiative, in particular the right to convene the 
Council of Ministers and the right to parti-
cipate in meetings of the Council of the 
European Union and the European Council, 
when the latter examine questions connected 
with the CFSP with a view to progressive 
co-operation towards convergence between 
the CFSP and WEU Secretariats; 
12. Hold more frequent meetings, parti-
cularly before the meetings of ministers 
responsible for the CFSP, in order to give 
them the necessary impetus; 
13. Take up the United Kingdom proposal 
to organise WEU summit meetings on the 
occasion of meetings of the European 
Council;" 
71. In its reply to Recommendation 558, the 
Council confirmed that it always welcomed " the 
positive contributions made by the WEU Assem-
bly to the development of the European security 
and defence identity through its reports, recom-
mendations, written questions and colloquia " and 
would " continue to consider with great attention 
any substantive input from the Assembly in this 
context"." ... The Council will continue to consi-
der with great attention any substantive proposal 
from the Assembly in this context " (reply to 
Recommendation 565). Moreover, in its reply to 
Recommendation 575, the Council recalls the 
terms of the Lisbon declaration in which WEU 
ministers stressed " the important role played by 
the Assembly in the debate on security and 
defence in Europe and its substantive contribution 
to the wider consideration of those issues. They 
welcomed the regular and constructive dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly". Further-
more, the Council states that it is " well aware of 
its duties under Article IX of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty " and " has no intention of entertaining 
institutional relations with other parliamentary 
bodies in either the European of the Atlantic 
context". 
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72. Nevertheless, the Council did " not see the 
need to obtain a general mandate to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions on behalf of the 
Union in WED's area of responsibility " as propo-
sed in Recommendation 558. The Council bases 
its attitude on the argument that WEU remains ins-
titutionally autonomous and responds to the 
Union's requests in the framework of its own deci-
sion-making procedures. However, it should be 
recalled that it is precisely the institutional auton-
omy of WEU that will be called into question 
during the negotiations at the intergovernmental 
conference, but when Recommendation 575 again 
raised the issue, asking for WEU to be recognised 
as an organisation authorised to act on behalf of 
the European Union in the areas for which WEU 
has responsibility, the Council had nothing to say 
on this aspect of the recommendation. 
73. To the Assembly's wish to act as the poli-
tical driving force for bringing the Central and 
Eastern European countries into Euro-Atlantic 
structures, the Council replied that " The Perma-
nent Council will play its political role in this res-
pect accordingly, by discussing, co-ordinating and 
harmonising measures with a view to developing 
a complementarity with initiatives towards 
Central and Eastern Europe of the European 
Union and NATO" (reply to Recommendation 
565). This reply calls for two observations at 
least: first, it refers to the activities of the Perma-
nent Council composed of senior officials who 
rely on instructions from their respective govern-
ments and therefore cannot play a political role 
and, second - this being the logical consequence 
of the first observation - the description of the 
action the Permanent Council intends to take in 
this connection has nothing to do with political 
impetus. 
74. In answer to Recommendation 565 which 
suggested that WEU might meet as a European 
security and defence council and take up the 
"United Kingdom proposal to organise WEU 
summit meetings on the occasion of meetings of 
the European Council" (Recommendation 575), 
the Council recalled that" it will be the responsi-
bility of WEU ministers to evaluate in due time 
the desirability of holding a WEU meeting at 
summit level" (reply to Recommendation 575). 
This statement is in contradiction with the reply to 
Recommendation 565 which states that it will be 
the Permanent Council's responsibility to make 
such evaluation in due time. To which of these 
two answers must one give credence? 
75. It is to be welcomed that the Permanent 
Council considers that the exchange of senior 
officials of relevant ministries between WEU 
states (as proposed in Recommendation 565) "is 
an idea worth pursuing as a contribution to the 
definition of a European security and defence 
identity " (reply to Recommendation 565). The 
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Council should therefore be asked what action it 
has taken in the meantime on this recommen-
dation. 
76. In publishing the document on WED's 
contribution to the European Union intergovern-
mental conference, the Council has not met the 
request put to it by the Assembly in Recommen-
dation 575 inviting the Council to transmit to it 
for early comment its assessment of future rela-
tions between WEU, the European Union and 
NATO. Nor has the Council acted upon the 
recommendation of the Assembly requesting the 
Council to arrange to be represented on the Euro-
pean Union reflection group. It has limited itself 
to stating that "the modalities of WED's parti-
cipation in the intergovernmental conference will 
be considered by the Council in due course " 
(reply to Recommendation 575). It has however 
assured the Assembly concerning paragraphs 1.6 
and I. 7 of the aforementioned recommendation 
that " the debate on the further development of 
WED's role will cover the full range of institu-
tional options as well as the necessary practical 
measures for their implementation ". 
77. The Council's sole reaction to the proposal 
to transform the Assembly of WEU into a second 
chamber of the European Parliament has been to 
refer to paragraph 31 of the Lisbon declaration 
which stresses that ministers recognise the impor-
tant role played by the Assembly. Moreover, the 
Council sees no reason for strengthening the poli-
tical role of the Secretary-General of WEU (reply 
to Recommendation 575). This attitude is the 
more surprising since for some time there has 
been discussion, in connection with the institutio-
nal reform of the CFSP, of appointing a senior 
figure responsible for ensuring continuity of the 
work of the various European bodies including 
those of WEU. If, according to certain proposals 
currently circulating within the European Union, 
this personality were also to be responsible for the 
Secretariat-General of WEU, might not this be 
sufficient reason for re-examining the role of the 
WEU Secretary-General and possibly suggesting 
that he might undertake that of senior official res-
ponsible for the common foreign and security 
policy? 
78. It is, however, to be welcomed that the 
Council has reacted positively to the Assembly's 
recommendation to hold more frequent meetings, 
particularly before meetings of ministers respon-
sible for the CFSP; in its own words the Council 
might "consider this possibility in due course", 
but it is necessary to point out to it that that time 
has now come. 
79. If, in short, it can be said that the Assembly 
has spared no effort to encourage the Council to 
play a far more active role in influencing the pre-
paratory work on institutional reform on the agen-
da of the intergovernmental conference and to 
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regard itself as a political player in its areas of res-
ponsibility, the impression is that an attitude of 
" wait and see " prevails in the Council for which, 
apart from initiatives intended to make WEU fully 
operational, the organisation seems to have no 
true political rOle. The statement that the Euro-
pean Union has become the main decision-
making body for many questions relating to for-
eign and security policy which directly influence 
the activities of WEU 9 is no doubt indicative of 
the uncertainty which seems to prevail in WED's 
ministerial organs. It is not surprising that this 
attitude also has an effect on the way in which the 
Council has prepared its contribution to the inter-
governmental conference and is developing diffe-
rent options concerning future relations between 
WEU and the European Union. 
Ill. Examination of possible options 
80. Any consideration of the aims to be achie-
ved following the intergovernmental conference 
must take account of the fact that the Maastricht 
Treaty has introduced an imbalance. Indeed, the 
provisions for achieving monetary union are wor-
ded very specifically while the implementation of 
a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
which is to lead only to an " eventual framing of a 
common defence policy which might in time lead 
to a common defence " is referred to in much 
vaguer terms. 
81. In the eyes of the German Government, inter 
alia, monetary union is not achievable without true 
political union, which implies a true common poli-
cy on foreign affairs, security and defence matters. 
The Germans have therefore insisted on the inter-
governmental conference being held in 1996, since 
they wished there to be enough time to achieve the 
desired progress before completion of the first 
stage of monetary union, which was originally to 
start in 1997. Meantime it has become clear that the 
first stage of monetary union cannot be achieved 
before 1999, or even later. 
82. However, the concern to make progress in 
the area of the CFSP is also fuelled by the fear that 
too great a delay in achieving deeper integration 
in external security may strengthen the trend in 
European countries towards renationalising their 
foreign policies. Moreover, as a new wave of 
enlargement is expected around the year 2000, 
many member countries feel that the process of 
political integration should be completed before 
that date. 
83. Certain countries nevertheless feel that the 
intergovernmental conference is being held too 
soon and does not leave them time to evaluate the 
9. See the address by Mr. Holtoff, Deputy Secretary-General 
ofWEU, at the session of the IHEDN, 13th October 1995. 
Maastricht Treaty experience, whereas the argu-
ment of a so-called 1998 " deadline " for the 
modified Brussels Treaty is used in the Maastricht 
Treaty itself to justify the need to make haste. 
84. Besides the question of time, a fundamental 
problem arises. There is seemingly agreement in 
thinking that the CFSP is not functioning satisfac-
torily. Yet there is no convergence of views on the 
reasons for this failure nor consequently on the 
steps to be taken if there is genuinely a wish to 
implement the CFSP. Solutions to make good the 
deficiencies are envisaged solely at institutional 
level. 
85. More particularly with regard to WED, it is 
agreed that for a variety of reasons, the organis-
ation still has an operational deficit. As to imple-
mentation of Petersberg-type missions and the 
concept of military units answerable to WED, it 
depends only partly on the agreement, still 
awaited, between WED and the alliance on the 
combined joint task forces. The political will of 
the WED member countries, essential for co-ordi-
nating operations and actions in the context of 
crisis-management, also raises problems, as the 
events in Rwanda and the conflict in the Balkans 
have shown. 
86. Moreover, it is recognised in all the mem-
ber countries that WED is suffering more general-
ly from a political deficit. It even appears that 
there is little disagreement about the causes. 
Member governments are virtually unanimous in 
affirming that it is due to the inadequacy of the 
relationship between WED and the European 
Union, for it is the latter that might and should 
provide the political impetus WED needs. 
87. All options under study therefore start from 
this premise. Before examining them in greater 
detail your Rapporteur wonders whether this pre-
mise may not be based on a fundamental error. 
One must first question not only the European 
Union's ability to give WED this impetus but also 
its political will to do so. First, the facts: the Euro-
pean Union has not yet taken a single decision 
which might have implications in WED's area of 
responsibility. Nor has it decided to take any spe-
cific action in that area. Consequently, the Euro-
pean Union has not yet made use of the possibility 
offered by Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
namely of requesting WED to elaborate and 
implement a decision or action of the Union. (The 
request to WED to send a police force to Mostar is 
the only exception.) 
88. Opportunities for the Union to take such 
initiatives, both before and after ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, have certainly not been lack-
ing. As an example, suffice it to recall that it was 
possible to request WED to elaborate and imple-
ment a European contribution to the reform of the 
United Nations in peace-keeping and crisis-mana-
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gement (see Recommendation 577 on Europe and 
the establishment of a new world order for peace 
and security). The European Union could equally 
have requested WED to send a rapid reaction 
force to Bosnia, instead of leaving the initiative to 
two or three member countries. 
89. The aptitude of the European Union autho-
rities to take joint decisions with defence implica-
tions is compromised, inter alia, as has been stres-
sed on many previous occasions, by the 
unwillingness of five countries of the Union to 
participate in closer military co-operation. 
90. One must stress, also, the complexity of the 
European Union's decision-making processes. 
These involve at its various levels: 
- the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs; 
- the Committee of permanent representa-
tives of member states created on the 
basis of Article 151 of the treaty establi-
shing the European Community whose 
task is to prepare the work of the 
Council; 
- the Political Committee created by 
Article J. 8 of the Maastricht Treaty 
(" without prejudice to Article 151 " 
above) composed of Political Directors 
and responsible for monitoring " the 
international situation in the areas cove-
red by common foreign and security 
policy " and contributing to " the defini-
tion of policies by delivering opinions to 
the Council at the request of the Council 
or on its own initiative ". The Political 
Committee also monitors " the imple-
mentation of agreed policies, without 
prejudice to the responsibility of the pre-
sidency and the Commission"; 
- at least fourteen working groups cove-
ring inter alia the following areas: securi-
ty, disarmament and armaments control, 
non-proliferation of chemical and biolo-
gical weapons, nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, the stability pact, the United 
Nations, the OSCE, Yugoslavia, Central 
and Eastern Europe, South-Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East/the Gulf, 
Maghreb/Machrek, the Middle-East 
peace process, consular matters (for 
planning possible evacuations); 
- the Secretariat-General of the Union 
Council; 
- the European Commission - and its vast 
bureaucracy - which, according to 
Article J.9 of the Maastricht Treaty, is 
" fully associated with the work carried 
out in the common foreign policy and 
security field ". 
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91. Added to the difficulty of co-ordinating the 
work of all these organs and avoiding conflicts of 
responsibility between them, there is a political 
problem. At a purely political level, the same 
ministers meet in the framework of WEU or of the 
CFSP and the good will of the ministers or of the 
heads of state and of government can in no way be 
questioned. However, the latter base their deci-
sions in large measure on the opinions and 
information provided by their respective bureau-
cracies. The general attitude of European Union 
bureaucrats towards WEU is well-known; there is 
virtually no interest in strengthening WEU. Quite 
the reverse, in the minds of those bureaucrats 
there is a single overriding objective: to absorb 
WEU. 
92. However, decisions concerning the future 
nature of relations between WEU and the Euro-
pean Union and in particular the future of WEU 
and its treaty cannot be based on institutional 
loyalty but must be based on an in-depth assess-
ment of experience acquired to date in the appli-
cation of the Maastricht Treaty and the declara-
tion of the WEU member countries, dated lOth 
December 1991, annexed to the treaty. In this 
context, development ofWEU's relations with the 
Atlantic Alliance, which is a particularly impor-
tant aspect in the framework of any re-examin-
ation of the present arrangements is dealt with 
primarily in the report on " WEU in the Atlantic 
Alliance" submitted by Lord Finsberg. Your 
Rapporteur will therefore concentrate on exami-
ning the development ofWEU's relations with the 
European Union, while being aware that these 
questions are closely linked both to transatlantic 
aspects and the development of WEU's opera-
tional role. 
93. The declaration made on lOth December 
1991 by the WEU member countries confirms 
that they " agree on the need to strengthen the role 
of WEU in the longer-term perspective of a com-
mon defence policy within the European Union". 
The declaration then goes on to state: 
" The objective is to build up WEU by 
stages as the defence component of the 
European Union. To this end WEU is pre-
pared, at the request of the European 
Union, to elaborate and implement deci-
sions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications. 
To this end, WEU will take the following 
measures to develop a close working rela-
tionship with the Union: 
- as appropriate, synchronisation of the 
dates and venues of meetings and harmo-
nisation of working methods; 
- establishment of close co-operation 
between the Council and Secretariat-
General of WEU on the one hand and the 
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Council of the Union and General Secre-
tariat of the Council on the other; 
- consideration of the harmonisation of the 
sequence and duration of the respective 
presidencies; 
- arranging for the appropriate modalities 
so as to ensure that the Commission of 
the European Communities is regularly 
informed and, as appropriate, consulted 
on WEU activities in accordance with 
the role of the Commission in the com-
mon foreign and security policy as defi-
ned in the Treaty on European Union; 
- encouragement of closer co-operation 
between the parliamentary Assembly of 
WEU and the European Parliament. " 
94. The Assembly has frequently criticised the 
Council for not conveying to it enough informa-
tion on the evolution of its working relations with 
the authorities of the Union. On the essential 
point in particular, namely WEU's elaboration 
and implementation, at the European Union's 
request, of decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defence implications, no concrete 
results are observable as your Rapporteur has 
already noted in paragraphs 87 and 88 above. But 
on reading the WEU contribution to the Euro-
pean Union intergovernmental conference of 
1996, we discover that the CFSP Security Work-
ing Group in May 1995 agreed a document on 
"Relations between the European Union and 
WEU" which it sent to WEU, but whose content 
was not communicated to the Assembly. The 
Council considers that: 
" The arrangements required to facilitate 
WEU's compliance with the " task to ela-
borate and implement decisions and actions 
of the Union which have defence implica-
tions " imply in particular the existence of 
an EU-WEU crisis-management mechan-
ism, which has yet to be developed, since 
this is an essential element of the WEU-EU 
framework of relations. In this sense: 
- It is necessary to develop modalities for 
the elaboration and implementation of 
EU decisions and actions which have 
defence implications, and to provide for 
a follow-up evaluation of their effective-
ness; 
- Crisis-management exercises are needed 
to faciliate the definition of flexible 
procedures which would allow for a 
truly operational WEU response; the 
simulated exercise scenarios would 
provide the opportunity for the study of 
command and control problems in 
accordance with the respective fields of 
competence; 
- It is necessary to establish the most 
unrestricted exchange of information 
between the two organisations as 
possible; 
- The conclusion of a security agreement 
between WEU and EU is required as 
well as the adjustment of the security 
standards in both organisations. " 
It is particularly surprising that it has not been 
possible to reach agreement with the European 
Union on this last point. 
95. It is clear from the Council's document on 
the WEU contribution to the European Union 
intergovernmental conference of 1996 that 
" agreement has not yet been reached on synchro-
nisation of the dates of meetings and harmonisa-
tion of working methods, nor has the issue of har-
monisation of the sequence of respective 
presidencies been settled " but no information is 
given on co-operation between the respective 
Councils and secretariats and with the European 
Commission. However the document does state 
that " closer co-operation between the parliamen-
tary Assembly of WEU and the European Parlia-
ment has not been promoted " and advocates 
encouraging closer co-operation between the two 
Assemblies. The Assembly has explained to the 
Council in detail the reasons why the close co-
operation the Council encouraged it to establish 
with the European Parliament has not yet been 
achieved. The Assembly expects the Council to 
take into consideration the explanations it has 
given and do what is necessary in its contacts with 
the European Union to ensure that the latter, and 
especially the European Parliament, treat the 
Assembly in appropriate fashion, namely as an 
integral part of the development of the European 
Union. 
96. Your Rapporteur furthermore considers 
that questions of harmonisation, rotation, duration 
and arrangements for the respective presidencies 
must be considered more fully. 
97. The Assembly is convinced that the inade-
quacies in the implementation of the objectives 
set out in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
declaration of 1Oth December 1991 stem prima-
rily from the inability of the European Union and 
in particular the CFSP to take joint decisions and 
give WEU the necessary political impetus. It is 
therefore necessary for the preparatory work for 
institutional reforms to be carried out in such a 
way that the necessary political impetus can come 
from WEU itself. It is in this perspective that the 
various options for organising future relations bet-
ween WEU and the European Union should be 
examined. 
98. In so doing it is necessary to recall that the 
WEU member states agreed at Maastricht on the 
need to develop a genuine European security and 
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defence identity and for Europe to take on more 
responsibility in defence matters. Moreover, it 
should be stressed that all WEU member coun-
tries have subscribed to Article C of the Maas-
tricht Treaty which states that "The [European] 
Union shall be served by a single institutional 
framework which shall ensure the consistency 
and continuity of the activities carried out in order 
to attain its objectives ... " and " shall in particular 
ensure the consistency of its external activities as 
a whole in the context of its external relations, 
security, economic and development policies ". 
Finally, all agreed that questions with defence 
implications will continue to be dealt with on the 
basis of the principle of the national sovereignty 
of each member state, which means that the pro-
cess of decision-making in this area will continue 
to be based on consensus. Now that these basic 
principles have been established, the various 
options at present being discussed for the organ-
isation of Europe's future security and defence 
identity must be considered and, where appro-
priate, additional solutions sought. 
99. In this context it is important to distinguish 
between two types of option: that tending to pre-
serve the modified Brussels Treaty and conse-
quently WEU, as an independent organisation, 
and those which foresee the ending of the treaty 
and WEU, with the essential elements of the 
treaty then being incorporated in the new Treaty 
on European Union, while the organs of WEU 
would either be dissolved or incorporated in the 
institutions of the European Union. 
1. The status quo option 
100. According to this option, the modified 
Brussels Treaty would be retained and WEU, and 
all WEU bodies, would continue to exist as an 
autonomous organisation, entirely independent of 
the European Union, while seeking practical 
arrangements for strengthening working relations 
and co-ordination between the WEU and Euro-
pean Union authorities. This option is based 
mainly on the United Kingdom proposal deve-
loped in the United Kingdom Government's 
memorandum dated 2nd March 1995 providing, 
inter alia, for regular meetings of WEU heads of 
state and of government (WEU summit meet-
ings). The solution it proposes is to give WEU the 
possibility of providing the necessary political 
impetus. 
101. If this option were to prevail, it would not 
be in contradiction with Article D of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, according to which the European 
Council provides the necessary impetus for the 
Union and lays down general political guidelines, 
since it specifically suggests that the European 
Council may transmit appropriate proposals to the 
WEU summit meeting. However, as Mrs. 
DOCUMENT 1495 
Aguiar's report has already explained, it would be 
more sensible to give the WEU summit meeting 
the responsibility of formulating proposals which 
would be endorsed by the European Council or, as 
proposed in Recommendation 565, to arrange that 
whenever decisions have to be taken in defence 
policy matters, the WEU Council meets as " the 
European Security and Defence Council " to take 
the necessary decisions. Such WEU summit meet-
ings would have several advantages: first, WEU 
associate member countries, namely Iceland, Nor-
way and Turkey, could participate and thus give 
decisions the stamp of authority that might be 
expected of a genuine European pillar of NATO. 
Second, WEU observer countries, which would 
also have the right to participate in these summits, 
would not be able to prevent decisions being 
taken on military matters. 
102. This option would also mean involving the 
WEU Secretary-General more closely in CFSP 
activities if he were invited to the meetings of the 
European Council whenever the latter was called 
upon to decide on WEU proposals. Another 
important point is that this option would enable 
WEU to achieve its objective of becoming fully 
operational. Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty would retain its full scope and countries 
with WEU observer status would be obliged to 
state clearly whether or not they wished to partici-
pate fully in the defence of Europe. Moreover, this 
solution would require specific arrangements to 
be reached on the financing of WEU activities by 
its member, associate member, observer and asso-
ciate partner countries, and also with the Euro-
pean Union. 
103. It is clear from the information given by the 
Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council that the 
United Kingdom is the only member country to 
support this approach (Option A in the WEU 
contribution to the intergovernmental confe-
rence). However nothing is known of the attitude 
of the associate member countries or the observer 
countries who were also involved in preparing the 
document. Paragraph 99 of the document further-
more states that: 
" This option would leave open the future 
development of European defence arrange-
ments. It could be implemented under 
arrangements maintaining WEU as an auto-
nomous organisation but is also compatible 
with a longer-term perspective of a more 
integrated approach. " 
2. The merger option 
104. Contrary to the previous option, a large 
number of member countries, supported in parti-
cular by the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament, are advocating going further at 
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the intergovernmental conference and laying the 
foundations there for effective integration of 
WEU into the European Union, the aim being to 
transfer to the Union all functions now exercised 
by WEU. This option, which is being examined in 
the European Union Reflection Group and also in 
WEU is basically different from the first one. It 
implies in fact the end of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and the disappearance of WEU as an orga-
nisation, the various bodies of which would either 
be dissolved or incorporated into the European 
Union. This eventuality is discussed in the 
Council's document on the WEU contribution to 
the European intergovernmental conference, 
under Option C. Here the possibility is explored 
of either incorporating the principal clauses of the 
modified Brussels Treaty within the second pillar 
of the Treaty on European Union (Option Cl) or 
of establishing a distinction between " Peters-
berg " type missions, which would be provided 
for under the treaty itself, and mutual assistance 
(defence against military attack), which would be 
dealt with in a protocol annexed to the Treaty 
(Option C2). 
105. The last of these possibilities has been 
envisaged to enable member countries, which do 
not participate in the joint defence but are invol-
ved in peace-keeping and crisis-management mis-
sions, to participate in due course in the joint 
defence by signing the appended protocol. Even if 
it is very unlikely that this option will win the 
approval of all the countries participating in the 
intergovernmental conference, it has a fair num-
ber of supporters and will certainly remain on the 
table, particularly when it comes to drawing up a 
precise timetable for achieving a full merger. 
106. An in-depth study of the possible conse-
quences of this option for relations with the Atlan-
tic Alliance and Euro-American relations has 
been undertaken in the report on " WEU in the 
Atlantic Alliance " submitted by Lord Finsberg. 
However, it is in the area of parliamentary super-
vision that the most sensitive problem arises. 
Even if the option in question is set, like all the 
others, in the framework of intergovernmental co-
operation, we should be in no doubt that its aim is 
to eliminate the legal basis for the existence of the 
WEU Assembly. The Council document states 
clearly that" The parliamentary Assembly's func-
tions would be assumed by the European Parlia-
ment in accordance with the provisions governing 
the CFSP ". If we are not prepared to accept that, 
under this option, the Assembly's functions are to 
be quite simply transferred to the European Par-
liament, other solutions must be found to resolve 
the problem of parliamentary supervision at Euro-
pean level. 
107. In this connection, it is important to stress 
clearly the incompatibility of any decision to 
transfer the responsibilities of the WEU Assem-
bly to the European Parliament with a decision 
designed to preserve the full national sovereignty 
of all member countries in defence matters as it 
would place the defence dimension in a purely 
intergovernmental framework. Indeed, it is neces-
sary first and foremost to recall that the European 
Parliament is a community institution whose 
members are elected by direct universal suffrage 
and have no political links with the national 
governments taking decisions in defence matters. 
108. Mrs. Guigou, a Socialist member of the 
European Parliament and member of the Reflec-
tion Group, emphasises the difficulty of organi-
sing variable geometry in the European Parlia-
ment 10• The problem could only be compounded 
by making security and defence a community 
policy, which is not envisaged. Another obstacle 
lies in the fact that the contracting parties to the 
modified Brussels Treaty are not the same as par-
ties to the Treaty on European Union. What would 
be the role of European Parliament delegates from 
countries that are not contracting parties to the 
modified Brussels Treaty, such as Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland or Sweden? Would they be. 
given voting rights for questions relating to 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty? This 
hardly seems acceptable since they would be 
granted the same rights as the signatories of the 
modified Brussels Treaty without, however, being 
bound by the obligations arising therefrom. With 
this idea in mind, it has been suggested that, for 
matters relating to defence policy, the European 
Parliament might sit in restricted session with 
only those countries that are signatories of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. However this would 
fundamentally change the rationale of the Euro-
pean Parliament which sees itself as a community 
body. Delegates are grouped according to political 
rather than national affiliation. The effect of 
restricted sessions, which would exclude some 
delegates on grounds of their nationality, would 
be to cloud the "community" nature of the Parlia-
ment without guaranteeing that the delegates sit-
ting there represented the interests and view-
points of their countries of origin. How would the 
associate member and associate partner countries 
participate in discussions relating to defence 
policy? Would the status they at present enjoy 
have to be withdrawn? 
109. To the extent that certain decisions in this 
area - such as the involvement of troops in 
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement actions 
- imply the possibility of loss of life, it is difficult 
to conceive of national parliaments transferring to 
a community authority the small amount of 
control they have left. In the contrary event, it 
would become possible for a majority of the 
10. Elisabeth Guigou, "Les enjeux de la Conference de 
1996 "-Revue des affaires europeennes, No. 1, April1995, 
page42. 
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members of the European Parliament, some of 
whom come from countries which are not mem-
bers of WEU and do not contribute to European 
joint forces, to vote to send troops from one coun-
try, against the will of delegates of that same 
country to the European Parliament. This example 
illustrates the problems which would arise if a 
" community " procedure were applied in an 
intergovernmental area. Moreover, there is 
nothing to indicate that European citizenship is 
already developed enough for citizens of member 
states to agree to their delegates being put a mino-
rity in the European Parliament. This might tend 
to reinforce the " Euroscepticism " that the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity was meant to reduce and 
seriously compromise ratification of the reforms 
of the 1996 intergovernmental conference. 
110. Given the way the Reflection Group of the 
European Union lightly dismissed any possibility 
of examining in greater depth the usefulness of a 
second chamber, urgent consideration must be 
given to solutions likely to guarantee adequate 
democratic control over defence policy at Euro-
pean level, without adding further to the present 
confusion of responsibilities. 
111. In the event of a merger of WEU with the 
European Union it would be easy to retain the 
WEU Assembly as the parliamentary body for the 
common European security and defence policy by 
integrating it into the European Union. This 
would allow the necessary flexibility in an area 
where the will for co-operation varies consider-
ably. On the one hand, the countries not wishing 
for the time being to be bound by the obligations 
arising from a common security and defence poll-
cy would not be given a right of decision. More-
over, the structure would remain open at all times 
to new members. The national parliaments would 
appoint their representatives to sit in national 
delegations which would have responsibility for 
supervising intergovernmental co-operation in 
defence matters. The other member states of the 
European Union would participate actively in the 
work as observers, as at present. Such an arrange-
ment would enable those states that do not wish to 
or cannot participate fully in the development of a 
common security and defence policy also to gain 
a hearing for their point of view. 
112. Such a solution would give a European 
dimension to parliamentary supervision, without 
which any co-operation project at European level 
would lack legitimacy, but without reducing the 
prerogatives of national parliaments in security 
and defence matters. Quite the reverse, it would 
serve the stated aim of the Treaty on European 
Union of encouraging closer participation by 
national parliaments in the activities of the Union 
(Declaration No. Xill). (Moreover, this solution 
would have the advantage of guaranteeing ade-
quate parliamentary supervision while preserving 
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the various constitutional traditions and ensuring 
the necessary speed and confidentiality). It will 
therefore be essential to stress, both to the mem-
ber governments on the WEU Council and the 
authorities of the European Union, that imple-
mentation of the option involving the denuncia-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty and the eli-
mination of WEU as an independent organisation 
will raise problems of parliamentary supervision 
which cannot be dealt with lightly. 
3. Intermediary options 
113. Since the observer countries in WEU are 
hesitating to accept the obligations stemming 
from the modified Brussels Treaty and therefore 
feel that a merger between WEU and the Euro-
pean Union cannot be achieved in the near future, 
and, furthermore, other governments are against a 
merger of WEU with the Union, advocates of 
such a merger have proposed intermediary arran-
gements for discussion which would permit the 
establishment of more binding links between the 
two organisations while, for the time being, main-
taining the separation between them and retaining 
the modified Brussels Treaty. Since most coun-
tries are of the opinion that agreement must be 
reached on concrete measures for the progressive 
integration of the two organisations, discussions 
at the intergovernmental conference will probably 
be concentrated on the feasibility of these inter-
mediary options, presented by the Council under 
Option B. 
114. They are based on the idea of introducing 
provisions into the Treaty on European Union 
which strengthen the subordination of WEU to the 
Union. Several solutions are envisaged, ranging 
from a purely political subordination of WEU to 
the Union either by giving the European Union 
the ability to draw up general guidelines for WEU 
(Option Bl), to the possibility even of compelling 
WEU politically to follow instructions issued by it 
(Option B2). Lastly the possibility is also being 
examined of concluding an agreement between 
the Union a)ld WEU under which WEU would be 
legally bound to implement decisions and actions 
of the European Union (Option B3). 
115. The implementation of such options in par-
ticular would require a declaration of the five 
members of the European Union with observer 
status in WEU. They would undertake not to 
hinder the adoption by the European Union of 
decisions having defence implications and on the 
basis of which the Union would give directives or 
instructions to WEU. The scope of such a declara-
tion by the five countries in question would be 
purely political, which points to the real weakness 
of such an arrangement. Furthermore, account 
must be taken of the fact that any strengthening of 
the European Union's right to address more or 
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less binding directives to WEU would automati-
cally give the European Union a greater say in the 
financing of WEU's actions. Consequently com-
plex financial arrangements must be envisaged 
between the European Union and WEU which 
should include the five observer countries. There 
must therefore be serious doubt about whether 
such an approach will genuinely facilitate the 
decision-making process within the Union. 
Moreover, one may wonder how greater subordi-
nation of WEU to the decisions of the European 
Union can be compatible with the three WEU 
associate member countries, Iceland, Norway and 
Turkey, which cannot participate in the decision-
making process in the framework of the European 
Union. 
116. However the greatest weakness in the inter-
mediary options now being studied lies - as your 
Rapporteur has already had occasion to note in 
earlier paragraphs - in the fact that they are based 
on an erroneous premise according to which 
impetus and initiative, even in connection with 
defence policy, must be provided by the Union, 
which takes the decisions, with WEU merely 
carrying them out. 
117. While it is true that the European Union has 
become the main decision-making body for most 
questions relating to the common foreign and 
security policy, it is nonetheless true that it has not 
yet been able to take the necessary decisions, 
particularly in areas with defence implications. 
The failure of the CFSP in the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia is an excellent example, whereas the. 
Council of Ministers of WEU had stated on 18th 
November 1991 that WEU member countries 
were prepared to provide practical support for a 
peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia 11 • 
118. The reasons for WEU's political deficit are 
therefore not due to an absence of institutional 
subordination in regard to the decisions of the 
Union but are primarily linked to the inability of 
the latter's authorities, particularly those of the 
common foreign and security policy, to reach 
agreement on decisions and, secondly, on the 
·wording of Article J.4, paragraph 2 of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, according to which WEU can act 
only at the request of the Union. It might conse-
quently be expected that formulae for making 
WEU more subordinate to the European Union 
may not help the European Union to overcome its 
own decision-making difficulties. Conversely, 
they would lead to virtually total paralysis of the 
political activities ofWEU. 
119. Your Rapporteur is nevertheless convinced 
that efforts to develop practical solutions with a 
view to institutional convergence between WEU 
11. See the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of 
the Council of the Assembly ofWEU, Document 1315, 25th 
May 1992. 
and the European Union should be pursued if one 
wishes to progress along the path marked out by 
the modified Brussels Treaty, which aimed to pro-
mote unity and encourage the progressive integra-
tion of Europe, and by the WEU declaration 
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty which proposes 
" building up WEU in stages as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union ". To this end the 
point of departure must be the following conside-
rations. 
120. Amendments to the provisions of Title V of 
the Maastricht Treaty governing the role of WEU 
will be essential. Indeed, it will be necessary to 
amend the Maastricht Treaty so as to enable WEU 
to act on behalf of the European Union in areas 
which fall within the former's area of responsibi-
lity. To this end, the provision that WEU can act 
only at the request of the European Union must be 
deleted. Moreover, WEU must be granted the 
power, within its area of responsibility, to take 
decisions whose consequences are politically bind-
ing upon the Union. This is why the proposal to 
set up summit meetings under the aegis of WEU 
to take the necessary decisions should be retained. 
121. To enable WEU to act on behalf of the 
Union in this way, it will be necessary to intro-
duce into the Treaty on European Union a politi-
cal commitment by the member countries of the 
European Union which are not members of WEU 
not to block in the European Union decisions 
taken by WEU. The Council of WEU should 
therefore work out an interim solution to this 
effect. In order to make such a solution truly 
effective, juridical links might be established bet-
ween the modified Brussels Treaty and the new 
Treaty on European Union in order to have a fmn 
basis from which WEU might fulfil its function as 
defence component of the European Union. This 
intermediary option has four advantages: first, 
decisions with defence implications might be 
made more easily and rapidly; second, they might 
be based directly on the expertise of military spe-
cialists; third, the institutional link between WEU 
and the European Union would be strengthened 
considerably and fourth, the countries which are 
not (yet) ready to participate in a common defence 
policy could not prevent the achievement of a 
consensus. 
122. However, it may be imagined that all the 
options at present under consideration will give 
rise to further divergences between member coun-
tries, even if a substantial majority appears to 
emerge formed of those ready to advance towards 
the full integration of WEU into the European 
Union. It is very clear from the WEU contribution 
to the intergovernmental conference in 1996 that 
the Council has not been able to reach agreement 
on a common WEU approach to this conference. 
There is therefore the risk of WEU leaving the 
final decision on the future organisation of the 
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Europe of security and defence to the intergo-
vernmental conference. The Assembly must there-
fore try to find a common position with a view to 
contributing to solutions acceptable to all concer-
ned. This will be one of the principal aims of the 
extraordinary session it will hold in London in 
February 1996. 
IV. The Assembly's contribution to promoting 
a common approach in WEU towards 
organising the Europe of security and defence 
1. The need to make reasonable and realistic progress 
in institutional reform 
123. The picture presented in the preceding 
chapters shows the complexity of the subject and 
the real difficulties the Assembly will have to 
overcome in order to reach a unanimous position 
at the intergovernmental conference. Your Rap-
porteur will nevertheless continue his search for a 
reasonable and sensible proposal for achieving 
consensus. The considerations which follow 
draw specifically on the search for a realistic 
solution, pragmatic and effective and at the same 
time coherent with the political will demonstra-
ted by WEU and its Assembly and with the posi-
tions defended by the latter on developing a 
European security and defence identity. It is pos-
sible to reach an agreement if one examines rigo-
rously and in a historical perspective the present 
situation as regards security and defence. It is 
universally recognised that it is necessary to act 
and demonstrate the political will to progress 
towards a security and defence system able to 
meet future challenges. Such a system must be 
based on commitments and contributions from all 
countries and must not rest on national defence 
structures taken in isolation. The European 
Union must include a defence component if it 
wishes truly to become a respected and powerful 
institution. 
124. Starting from these principles, accepted by 
all WEU members, it must be possible to reach a 
common position to present to the intergovern-
mental conference. Failing this, our Assembly 
would experience a resounding defeat and would 
miss this exceptional opportunity of acting jointly. 
However, the arguments used in the debate are in 
many respects the source of confusion that must 
be dispelled or fought. There are also real 
problems of a political nature which it is essential 
to analyse in order to try and resolve or circum-
vent them over time. By way of example one 
might mention the presence in the European 
Union of five countries which are not members of 
WEU and are not to become so in the near future, 
together with the fact that three WEU associate 
member countries are not members of the Euro-
pean Union. 
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125. Ideas often appear confused when it comes 
to defining what is meant by " common defence ". 
The term does not mean bringing defence respon-
sibilities into the " Community system " as some 
fear (and others might wish). On the contrary, this 
notion must be understood in the context of the 
mutual assistance obligation member countries 
have in the event of military attack against any 
one of them, as stipulated in Article V of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. This binding provision 
does not change in any way the principle that the 
decision to come to the aid of a country under 
attack must be taken at national level. In any 
event, member states are sovereign in any deci-
sion to participate in military operations in a 
crisis-management, peace-keeping or peace-
making context. 
126. All these questions concerning defence poli-
cy and defence itself will therefore, for a long time 
to come, be the responsibility of states. Even when 
a common defence has come into being, each coun-
try will decide the arrangements for its participa-
tion; if each one remains master of its own defence 
plans, doct:rii:te, strategy, financial resources, wea-
pons and weapons systems, its service and military 
career structure and its legislation in this area and 
if, in short, each state remains free to intervene or 
not according to circumstances, national sove-
reignty over defence will not be threatened. To 
regard integration subject to such reservations as 
abandoning national responsibilities is an incom-
prehensible exaggeration. It should be recalled that 
there is total agreement on maintaining defence 
within the realm of state sovereignty. 
127. The term "integration" can also lead to 
confusion. Integration does not necessarily mean 
" bringing into the Community system ", or a 
merger, in other words the disappearance of 
WEU. Given that there is wide consensus on the 
fact that the defence dimension cannot be brought 
into the Community system, the main question it 
raises is whether progressive convergence will be 
pursued between the institutions of WEU and the 
European Union in an intergovernmental frame-
work by maintaining the modified Brussels Treaty 
alongside the Treaty on European Union and 
adding to it the clauses facilitating closer links 
between them, at the same time waiting until the 
conditions are met for a merger of the two treaties, 
or whether the moment to bring to an end the 
modified Brussels Treaty should be regarded as 
having arrived and the latter replaced in its enti-
rety by the provisions incorporated into the new 
Treaty on European Union. Your Rapporteur is 
convinced that the time is not yet ripe for bringing 
the modified Brussels Treaty to an end. Such a 
policy would not serve to strengthen the European 
defence identity. 
128. False ideas about WEU's position in the 
process of developing European defence are to be 
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avoided. The issue is not WEU versus the Euro-
pean Union. Rather the signatories to the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty have registered in the treaty 
itself their determination to take the necessary 
measures to promote the progressive integration 
of Europe. In the declaration annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty, it is clear that WEU is joining 
in the process of establishing itself as the defence 
component of the European Union. Subsequently, 
on the occasion of all its meetings and declara-
tions, WEU has constantly shown its will to 
contribute to the implementation of a European 
defence identity in the framework of the European 
Union. It is therefore pointless to look in our 
documents for positions contrary to the process 
set in train at Maastricht. The defence of the 
organisation and its development at institutional 
level have always concorded exactly with the 
principles of Maastricht. Recommendation 575 in 
Mrs. Aguiar's report provides an illustration. 
129. As regards WEU's official position, whe-
ther one considers the Council or the Assembly, 
the organisation has, since the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty, followed the same political 
direction towards participation in a common 
defence in conformity with that marked out in the 
Treaty on European Union. The objectives are 
clear but it is entirely natural for differences to 
emerge over arrangements and particularly over 
the timetable for convergence between WEU and 
the European Union. First and foremost it should 
be recalled that WEU is constantly evolving 
towards becoming fully operational and finding 
answers to the basic questions raised by the crea-
tion of a common defence policy and a common 
defence. The experts of the European Union tas-
ked with the preparation of its institutional 
reforms and a fair number of member govern-
ments seem entirely convinced that only very 
speedy introduction of the defence dimension into 
the single framework of the European Union 
could provide the solution to all these problems. 
130. One cannot demand at one and the same 
time full integration of WEU into the Union and 
possibly the disappearance of the former, and 
increased efforts to make it fully operational. 
There cannot be integration if there is nothing to 
integrate. Consequently WEU must be given the 
time and above all the means to develop fully. In 
this connection, it is unfortunately necessary to 
take note of an attitude that is very widespread 
among the authorities of the Union and of the 
Atlantic Alliance and even within governments of 
member countries which severely criticise WEU 
for not making progress and having no means. 
WEU can advance only if it is given the possibi-
lity and the means to do so. 
131. Making WEU an effective and vital instru-
ment is therefore a necessary transitional stage 
pending integration. As to the government repre-
sentatives and community experts in the Reflect-
ion Group, it is obvious that despite their inclina-
tion towards a merger they are convinced that this 
option can be achieved only in the distant future, 
for which a date cannot be fixed. They therefore 
also insist that WEU should be strengthened ope-
rationally. 
132. Moreover, in the thinking in the Union and 
WEU and the declarations of some ministers, the 
idea constantly recurs that WEU should act only 
" upon instruction ", " at the request ", while 
remaining" subordinate" to the European Union. 
This notion, expressed in the bluntest of terms, in 
your Rapporteur's opinion runs counter to the spi-
rit and the aims of the Maastricht Treaty. It should 
therefore be recalled that WEU is an integral part 
of the process of development of the European 
Union and not an institution apart from the Union 
the activities of which should be "controlled". 
WEU has been tasked with developing the 
defence policy of the European Union. 
133. If one agrees that WEU may act on behalf 
of the European Union in security and defence 
matters, it is inconceivable that in accomplishing 
this task it should take initiatives only after 
receiving" instructions" from the Union. As past 
experience has shown, it is difficult to see which 
body of the Union, which has no responsibility in 
this area, will be able to give WEU specific 
guidance. 
134. Your Rapporteur is convinced, as stated in 
the section on consideration of intermediary 
options, that it would be absurd to restrict the role 
of WEU, the only competent organisation with 
experience in defence matters and also in security 
matters in the wider sense, purely to that of exe-
cutor of instructions from the Union. To make the 
procedure effective, it is necessary - as the 
Assembly has requested on several occasions - to 
give WEU a general mandate to formulate the 
broad outlines of the defence policy. To ratify the 
decisions resulting from it, it will suffice to bring 
together heads of state and of government under 
the aegis of WEU, who will take decisions simul-
taneously on behalf of the European Union. 
Another formula might be for WEU to make pro-
posals to the European Council which would 
approve them. However, this variant would 
require suitable arrangements to prevent the five 
countries, not members of WEU, from blocking 
consensus reached in WEU when the proposals 
were examined by the European Council. 
2. The need to develop a common security and defence 
project for Europe 
135. The achievement of qualitative progress 
towards laying the foundation of a true European 
security and defence identity constitutes one of 
the· major objectives of the 1996 intergovernmen-
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tal conference. The " defence " issue is, however, 
so complicated that it would be dangerous to take 
quick decisions and decide on options the conse-
quences of which had not been fully thought out. 
The alleged pressure of public opinion and politi-
cal and media circles at the present juncture 
should not prevent the debate on complex ques-
tions of security and defence being conducted in 
the calm and cautious atmosphere that is essential. 
136. Those who consider that the intergovern-
mental conference is being held too soon for it to 
be possible to take decisions with a major impact 
on defence policy have sound arguments on their 
side. The CFSP has not had time to develop and 
WEU has not been able to complete the work it 
started on formulating a common defence policy 
and preparing to become operational. It would 
therefore be inappropriate to take institutional 
decisions without basic questions having been 
examined thoroughly. 
137. It seems inconceivable, as your Rapporteur 
has already stated in paragraphs 54-63 of this 
report, to arrive at institutional decisions without 
there being a consensus on security and defence in 
Europe or a joint concept as to the purpose of a 
European defence identity. In this connection, 
there is still neither a common assessment of risks 
nor a coherent point of view on defence doctrines, 
operational strategy, armaments policy, industrial 
policy, intelligence and the financial aspects of 
the foregoing. 
138. However in the first place it should be 
remembered that institutional decisions cannot be 
taken unless there is agreement on how nuclear 
deterrence should be dealt with in the context of a 
European defence identity, taking into consider-
ation the development of the most sophisticated 
technologies in this field. 
139. All these considerations lead your Rappor-
teur to recommend that the governments con-
cerned exercise caution in their decisions on the 
institutional options. Thus the intermediate 
options would appear to be the most suitable for 
securing progress towards progressive convergen-
ce between WEU and the European Union and the 
definition of a common defence policy. 
140. Moreover, the consequences of building up 
the Europe of defence and of enlarging WEU and 
the European Union eastwards and southwards 
cannot be ignored. It is too soon to tell whether 
the problems such enlargement will involve call 
for acceleration of the process of integrating 
defence into the Union or, on the contrary, for a 
more cautious approach, as your Rapporteur 
believes. 
141. It is to be hoped that a white paper on Euro-
pean security being drawn up by the twenty-seven 
countries co-operating in WEU with various sta-
tuses will constitute the basis necessary for defin-
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ing a common defence policy with a transatlantic 
(NATO) and a pan-European dimension (OSCE). 
It is here - not in institutional problems - that lies 
the major challenge for the years to come. The 
development of a common concept of defence, 
able to solve the problems of the next millennium, 
will require more time. This is another reason why 
the intergovernmental conference can only take 
provisional measures in institutional terms. 
3. The course for WEU to follow 
142. Any consideration of the future of WEU 
must start from a knowledge and an in-depth eva-
luation of the evolution of this organisation and 
the progress it has achieved since its creation and 
from a very clear awareness of the place it cur-
rently occupies in organisations which comple-
ment one another. It is thus that one rediscovers 
the unique character of this organisation. With 
limited means and staff, WEU has succeeded in 
establishing capabilities in all sectors relating to 
defence: armaments, information, logistics, plan-
ning, analysis, creation of multinational forces 
and parliamentary supervision. The modified 
Brussels Treaty is still the only legal and political 
guarantee of a collective European defence 
mechanism. It is also the essential contractual link 
with the Atlantic Alliance of which WEU is the 
European pillar. Participation of the nine Central 
European countries, three member countries of 
NATO and five observer countries in the work of 
WEU in an intergovernmental and parliamentary 
framework have made WEU the ideal institution 
for gradually establishing the defence dimension 
of the European Union. 
143. This is precisely the route mapped out by 
the Maastricht Treaty. Questions concerning 
WEU's area of responsibility do not by their nature 
lend themselves as readily to rapid progress as 
those concerning other areas. However, this does 
not mean that the organisation is at a standstill or 
that its aim is to maintain the status quo. Further-
more, it is obvious that a decision to bring to an 
end the modified Brussels Treaty, and WEU as an 
organisation, would create more problems than it 
would solve. Faced with the all-round reduction 
in defence budgets, negotiating new provisions to 
replace the treaty, with partners reluctant to com-
mit themselves to a common defence, would be a 
dangerous undertaking. Moreover it would be 
disastrous to replace WEU's relatively simple 
structures with the bureaucratic labyrinth of the 
European Union. 
144. On the other hand, it is not the Assembly's 
intention to defend WEU as an organisation in the 
name of inappropriate institutional chauvinism. 
The Assembly is merely convinced that WEU's 
task has not been completed. While one may 
concede that there is a need to bring the defence 
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dimension into a single framework, differences 
over the most appropriate approach for achieving 
this, particularly as regards the timetable and the 
various stages of the process, still have to be 
resolved. 
145. There are many reasons why your Rappor-
teur does not think immediate integration of WEU 
in the European Union is achievable. First of all, 
the fact that at least one member country has pre-
sented substantial arguments against this solution 
cannot be ignored. In defence matters, consensus 
must be preserved. This area is not comparable 
with that of the social charter or the environment. 
A country cannot be excluded from Europe 
because it has voted against the majority. Conse-
quently your Rapporteur wishes to stress that the 
idea, seriously being considered in the European 
Parliament, of requesting a country not prepared 
to go forward at the same pace as the others to 
withdraw from the European Union is, in his opi-
nion, utterly irresponsible. European solidarity in 
security and defence matters is the result of close 
co-operation since the end of the second world 
war and must not be called into question. 
146. The problems that would arise if the Euro-
pean Union replaced WEU as the European pillar 
of NATO are discussed exhaustively in the report 
on WEU in the Atlantic Alliance, submitted by 
Lord Finsberg. It is pointless to refer to them 
again here. The question of parliamentary super-
vision has been discussed in paragraphs 106 to 
112. It emerges clearly from such considerations 
that one cannot take hasty or improvised decisions 
in such a sensitive area. 
147. WEU is called upon to play a part in the 
progressive introduction of a defence dimension 
into the responsibilities of the European Union, as 
it is the work and existence of WEU as an inde-
pendent body that enables progress to be made on 
defence questions in Europe. It is not WEU's fault 
that Europe is failing to make headway in its 
external and security relations. The reason for the 
delays and stagnation lies rather in the inability of 
the European Union authorities to implement a 
common foreign and security policy, while WEU, 
for its part, has evolved in full accordance with 
the mandate it was given at Maastricht. 
148. Thus the greatest service WEU can render 
Europe is to create the conditions for the Euro-
pean security and defence identity to become a 
reality and for the European Union to be able to 
rely on it in the defence sphere. In the meantime, 
the Union should improve its capabilities in order 
to carry out a proper common foreign and security 
policy. All of this requires time, which is why 
your Rapporteur is convinced that all those who 
sincerely wish for progress in the construction of 
a European security and defence identity should 
endeavour to find solutions through the inter-
mediate options. 
V. Conclusions 
149. In the face of the problems encountered by 
Europe and WEU in particular on the eve of the 
1996 intergovernmental conference and the new 
challenges which Europe will have to overcome 
in security matters in the era post 2000, it is 
important first of all for the Assembly to state 
its positions and convictions, if possible unani-
mously or at least by a large majority. 
150. Your Rapporteur is convinced that such 
consensus is possible despite all the difficulties 
that arise. The positions of those advocating the 
pursuit of progressive integration of WEU in the 
European Unon and those that support WEU 
being maintained indefinitely as an institution 
independent of the European Union can be recon-
ciled in the framework of intermediary solutions: 
the latter have as their focus strengthened partner-
ship arrangements between the two institutions, 
which have all-round support. 
151. A short-term consensus can therefore be 
reached on the position WEU is to defend next 
year. On this basis it is necessary to develop 
longer-term thinking both on the definition of a 
common defence policy and the institutional 
aspects of the question. It should again be noted 
that wide consensus exists for so doing with 
regard to the following points: 
- Europe must assume greater responsibi-
lity for defence matters; 
- it cannot deal in isolation with the new 
challenges and risks facing it, but must 
respond to them collectively; 
- consequently, it is necessary for the 
European Union to have a true common 
policy in defence matters in order to 
create a real European defence identity; 
- the European Union must still imple-
ment a true common foreign and security 
policy; 
- the principle of national sovereignty 
remains the essential reference in this 
area and must therefore be governed by 
the rules of consensus; 
- no country should be obliged to partici-
pate in military action by the Union and 
none should be able to prevent a majority 
of member states from carrying out such 
action. 
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- the Atlantic Alliance remains the essen-
tial authority for safeguarding the peace 
and defence of Europe; 
- WEU which is evolving as the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, should 
carry out its tasks in close co-operation 
with NATO in a spirit of transparency 
and complementarity; 
- WEU will pursue the development of its 
subsidiary organs and endeavour to 
become fully operational; 
- WEU will intensify its relations with the 
Central and Eastern European countries 
with a view to more in-depth consider-
ation of the future role of these countries 
in a European security and defence 
order. 
152. The challenge of the intergovernmental 
conference will require that the Assembly make 
substantial efforts to clarify the above points, 
taking account of the evolution of negotiations 
between governments. We are at present in a fluc-
tuating situation, while discussions are being held 
in all forums whose task it is to formulate initial 
positions for the inter-governmental conference. 
The debate in progress in the European Union is 
highly visible to public opinion, unlike that within 
WEU. This organisation consequently is still 
considered more as a subject for discussion than 
an actor capable of influencing a choice of direc-
tion. While the Reflection Group of the European 
Union (which has no responsibility for defence 
matters) is openly discussing WEU's future, the 
WEU Council is taking no public position in the 
discussions on the reform of the CFSP, although 
this issue is crucial to the question of WEU's res-
ponsibilities. 
153. The Assembly, as a body composed of 
representatives of the peoples of member coun-
tries, therefore has a difficult task. It must enrich 
the debate by making a substantial contribution to 
it over the whole period leading up to and during 
the conference. At the same time, in the negotia-
tions themselves, it must make proposals that may 
serve to strengthen European security in the com-
mon interest. The recommendations which pre-
cede this report are the expression of the firm will 
of the Assembly fully to comply with its functions 
on the eve of a year in which Europe finds itself 
poised at a crossroads. 
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